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A PROPOSED WEST VIRGINIA RESPONSE TO THE
INITIATIVE OF REGULATION D
JAms A. RUSSELL*
In the words of William S. Casey, a former Chairman of the Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC"):
From the time of Pericles through Elizabeth I down to Polaroid, the cutting
edge of dynamic societies has been the innovator, risking his own savings and
those of others having confidence in him, whether on the waves of the high
seas and new horizons or those of high technology and new services. Almost
every new technology that has given a lift to the American economy has come
from a new company, struggling in a garage or venturing out to obtain needed
capital from the public.'
Whether one is moved to prose to the same extent as Mr. Casey, one cannot
deny the impact on the American economy of people like Alexander Graham
Bell, Thomas Edison and Henry Ford. In terms of jobs, revenues, and techno-
logical development, promoters of small, growing enterprises have contributed
more than their share to the well-being of all of us."
Many, if not most, entrepreneurs have sprung from a common background
- a new idea, worthy of development, a shortage of funds to develop the idea
on their own and a shortage of assets to secure a lender. Due to the inappropri-
ateness or unavailability of other forms of financing,3 these promoters4 have
often looked to the public for venture capital. Of course, when one obtains
money from others, he has to give something in return. When that return is a
share of the enterprise, the thing given is called a security,5 and the transaction
* B.S., U.S. Military Academy, West Point, 1969; J.D., West Virginia University, 1977; Part-
ner, Steptoe & Johnson, Clarksburg, West Virginia.
Casey, SEC Rules 144 and 146 Revisited, 43 BROOKLYN L. REV. 571, 572 (Spring 1977) [here-
inafter cited as Casey].
' Casey, supra note 1, at 573 n.4. See H.R. REP. No. 1341, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1980),
reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4800, 4802.
3 Debt financing is often unavailable due to the lack of collateral to adequately secure a lender
or because of the venture's poor cash flow prospects to service debt payments in the early stages of
the project. An outright sale of a patentable idea or a sale coupled with a reservation of a percent-
age of the profits realized from marketing the resulting product or service is often not a realistic
possibility due to the unrealistically high value placed on the idea by the creator or the lack of
purchasers who share the creator's belief in the ultimate profitability of the venture. Mofsky, Blue
Sky Restrictions on New Business Promotions, 1969 DuKE L.J. 273, 275 [hereinafter cited as
Mofsky].
' The term "promoter" suffers from excessive usage in securities jargon and, thus, lacks mean-
ing due to overdefinition. As used herein, a promoter is the person or entity sponsoring the sale of
equity interests in the enterprise or investment vehicle used to raise funds for the particular
venture.
' The term "security" is defined in securities laws, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77b.(1) (1976), and typi-
cally includes such common securities as stocks, bonds, and the like. Statutory definitions of "se-
curity" are not limited to such conventional securities, however, and include such things as an
"investment contract" and a "certificate of interest or participation in an oil, gas, or mining title or
lease ... ." W. VA. CODE § 32-4-401(1) (1982).
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is subject to regulation.
The stock market crash of 1929 was perceived at the time as the major
cause of the Great Depression. The ensuing political and economic turmoil re-
sulted in the election of Franklin D. Roosevelt, which in turn, brought on an
unprecedented intrusion of the federal government into the affairs of private
enterprise. Due to President Roosevelt's desire to restore a degree of confi-
dence in the securities market,6 his first significant act as President was to
recommend to Congress the bill which, in short order, became the Securities
Act of 19331 (hereinafter "the Securities Act").
The principal function of the Securities Act is to regulate new offerings of
securities through registration.8 Registration, it was felt, would protect the in-
vestor by requiring the disclosure of specified information about the issuer9 -
the entity which proposes to sell the securities - and the security, so that an
informed investment decision can be made. Section 5 of the Securities Act10
contains the basic provision and requires all securities offered or sold in inter-
state commerce to be registered with the SEC."
Other sections of the Securities Act specify the contents of the registration
statement 2 and proscribe the use of false or misleading information therein. s
The consequence of errors is devastating - return of all funds received from
the sales, plus interest, less income received in respect of the investment.1 4
A highly specialized segment of the legal and accounting professions
emerged to assist issuers in dealing with the rigors of registration. Of course,
the cost of the process is substantial. An analysis of six smaller registered pub-
lic offerings made in 1976, each of which was made by a company with assets
of less than $5 million, reveals that the average cost of registering the offerings
was $122,350.15
The cost of registration forces promoters in need of venture capital to seek
alternatives. However, due to the unavailability of other forms of financing, the
promoter has only two realistic options: abandon the venture or try to fit
within one of the exemptions from registration under the Securities Act. In its
wisdom, Congress provided two categories of exemptions from registration: ex-
empted securities and exempt transactions."
S Ash, Reorganizations and other Exchanges Under Section 3(a)(10) of the Securities Act of
1933, 75 Nw. U.L. REv. 1 (1980).
1 The Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§
77a to 77aa (1976)).
8 D. Ratner, SECURTIEs REGULATION 6 (1975).
' "The term 'issuer' means every person who issues or proposes to issue any security .. " 15
U.S.C. § 77b(4) (1976).
10 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1976).
11 Id.
12 15 U.S.C. §§ 77f(a), 77g, 77j and 77aa (1976).
.3 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1976).
" Id. E.g., Lynn v. Caraway, 252 F. Supp. 858 (W.D. La. 1966), a/I'd, 379 F.2d 943 (5th Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 951 (1968).
' Casey, supra note 1, at 575.
'6 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c, 77d (1976).
[Vol. 85
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An exempted security is primarily characterized by the nature of the is-
suer, the extent of regulation by some other federal agency, or the jurisdic-
tional limitations of the Securities Act. Examples are obligations issued or
guaranteed by governmental bodies,"' securities issued by common carriers reg-
ulated by the Interstate Commerce Commission,18 and securities offered or sold
in purely intrastate transactions. 9 Section 3(a) of the Securities Act20 lists the
exempted securities.
Because most promoters cannot issue exempted securities, the transac-
tional exemptions have to be used. The transactional exemption relied upon
most often has been the section 4(2) exemption for transactions "not involving
any public offering."21 Despite the vagaries of the so-called "private offering"
exemption as developed by the courts and the SEC, the private placement of
securities to raise venture capital has long been a common financing tech-
nique.2 2 However, the burden of compliance with the subjective conditions of
the exemption has been less than the burden of registration only in relative
terms.28
If the promoter can qualify under, or more appropriately, is willing to risk
reliance upon the private placement exemption as an alternative to registration
under the Federal Securities Act, then he must also compy with the require-
ments of state securities laws. Almost al 2' of the states have "blue sky" laws"
which also require the registration of securities offered or sold within their bor-
ders.26 The promoter has to register with each of those states or qualify for an
exemption if one is available. State registration is not cheap,27 and many state
exemptions are quite restrictive*' and incompatible with the federal
exemptions."
The promoter of the business seeking venture capital has a dual burden of
complying with the regulatory schemes of the federal government and with
each of the states in which his offering is made. The burden of compliance has
often been unrealistically related to the needs of the investing public for
protection.
17 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2) (1976).
1S 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(6) (1976).
" 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (1976).
20 15 U.S.C. § 77c (1976).
2 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1976).
2 See generally Casey, supra note 1; Alberg and Lybecker, New SEC Rules 146 and 147: The
Nonpublic and Intrastate Offering Exemptions for the Sale of Securities, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 622
(1974).
23 Casey, supra note 1, at 574.
" 69 AM. JUR. 2D Securities Regulation-State § 1 (1973).
25 State securities acts have come to be known as "blue sky" laws. The name is attributable to
a comment of Mr. Justice McKenna that an Ohio statute was aimed at "speculative schemes which
have no more basis than so many feet of 'blue sky. . . ."' Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539,
550 (1917).
26 E.g., W. VA. CODE § 32-3-301(1) (1982).
27 Mofsky, supra note 3, at 276.
28 See, e.g., Upton v. Trinidad Petroleum Corp., 468 F. Supp. 330 (N.D. Ala. 1979).
2" See generally L. Loss, COMMENTARY ON THE UNIFORM SECuRIEs AcT 124-30 (1976).
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Effective April 15, 198230 the SEC adopted a new series of six rules, col-
lectively designated Regulation D. The rules implement three tiers of exemp-
tions from registration under the Securities Act, based upon the dollar amount
of the offering.3 1 Regulation D was designed to clarify, simplify, and expand
the availability of prior exemptions under section 4(2) and under section 3(b)
of the Securities Act 32 and to serve as the basic framework for compatible fed-
eral and state regulation of new offerings of unregistered securities.a3 In con-
junction with its re-evaluation of the impact of its rules and regulations on
capital formation by small businesses, which resulted in Regulation D, the SEC
collaborated with the Small Business Financing Subcommittee of the North
America Securities Administrators Association ("NASAA") to develop a com-
patible and, it was hoped, uniform federal-state exemption.3 The process re-
sulted in NASAA's adoption of an official policy guideline recommending to its
members a "Uniform Limited Offering Exemption. 3 5 Thus, the SEC and
NASAA have produced an initiative for improving or eliminating one of the
chief problems heretofore encountered by the issuer of unregistered securities
- the existence of multiplicitous, incompatible regulation of the primary
offering.
The purpose of this Article is to examine the changes made in the federal
law by Regulation D and the changes which need to be made in the present
"limited offering" exemption from registration under the West Virginia Uni-
form Securities Act.38 Part I narrates the history of the statutory exemptions
from registration which underlay Regulation D and points out some of the
problems those exemptions posed for issuers. Part H examines Regulation D
itself and Part III examines and criticizes the present status of the limited
offering exemption in West Virginia. Part IV identifies a proper scope of secur-
ities regulation at the state level and recommends the adoption of three ex-
emptions from registration under the West Virginia Uniform Securities Act,
consistent with the tiered scheme of Regulation D.
I.
Regulation D replaces three prior exemptive rules of the SEC: Rules 146,37
30 Securities Act Release No. 6389, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251 (1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §§
230.501-.506).
3' The tiered levels are: (a) offerings up to $500,000 (Rule 504); (b) offerings up to $5 million
(Rule 505); and (c) offerings with no dollar limitation (Rule 506).
32 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c(b), 77d(2) (1976).
" Securities Act Release No. 6389, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251 (1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §§
230.501-.506).
Millstone & Chester, Regulation D: New Opportunities for Small Business, 9 BARRISTER
21, 25 (1982).
3" Resolution of NASAA Endorsement of Revised Uniform Limited Offering Exemption (ap-
proved April 30, 1982) and NASAA Uniform Limited Offering Exemption, reprinted in 1 BLUE
SKY L. REP. (CCH) 15294, 5294A (1982). See also 1 PriVATE PLACEMENTS IN OIL UNDER SEC REGU-
LATION D 453-62 (L. Mosburg ed. 1982) [hereinafter cited as Mosburg].
30 W. VA. CODE §§ 32-1-101 to 32-4-418 (1982).
'7 17 C.F.R. § 230.146 (1980) (rescinded, effective June 30, 1982, in Securities Act Release No.
6398, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251 (1982)).
[Vol. 85
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24038 and 242.9 An understanding of the workings of these rules and the statu-
tory underpinning of the rules is necessary to gain a working knowledge of
Regulation D.
A. Rule 146
Section 4(2) of the Securities Act 0 exempts from the registration require-
ment of section 5 "transactions by an issuer not involving any public offer-
ing.""' The operative terms, "public offering," is not defined in the Securities
Act, but the sparse legislative history concerning the scope of the exemption
indicates that it was intended to apply when there is "no practical need"'2 for
registration or when the "public benefits [of registration] are too remote.' 3 A
reference to the exemption in the Conference Committee Report suggests that
a sale of securities would not involve a public offering when the purchasers are
"small in number."' "
Shortly after the enactment of the Securities Act, the SEC announced cer-
tain factors which, in its view, are relevant to whether an offering is "public,"
including: the number of offerees, their relationship to the issuer and to each
other; the number of shares or units offered; and the size and manner of the
offering.4 Thus, the nature of the offering was initially felt to be primarily
determinative of the availability of the exemption. Due to the imprecision of
the other factors, judicial decisions, and hence issuers, tended to place the
most weight on the one measurable criterion, the number of offerees.' 6 The so-
called "Rule of 25" was informally adopted,47 and a degree of predictability
developed.
Predictability began to decrease, however, with the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in SEC v. Ralston Purina Company.48 Ralston Purina involved the unre-
gistered sale of treasury stock to a large number of employees of the corporate
defendant. Although no solicitation of the purchasers occurred, between 1947
and 1951 nearly $2 million of stock was sold to employees of Ralston Purina
whose positions ranged from stock clerk to stenographer to veterinarian and
whose residences were scattered from California to Texas to New Hampshire."
33 Id. at § 230.240.
81 Id. at § 230.242.
40 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1976).
41 Id.
42 H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1933).
43 Id.
" H.R. CON. REP. No. 152, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1933).
45 Securities Act Release No. 285, 11 Fed. Reg. 10,952 (1935).
46 E.g., Merger Mines Co. v. Grismer, 137 F.2d 335 (9th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 794
(1943); SEC v. Sunbeam Gold Mines Co., 95 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1938); Corporation Trust Co. v.
Logan, 52 F. Supp. 999 (D. Del. 1943); Campbell v. Degenther, 97 F. Supp. 975 (W.D. Pa. 1951).
47 See Securities Act Release No. 285, 11 Fed. Reg. 10,952 (1935). See also Soraghan, Private
Offerings: Determining "Access," "Investment Sophistication," and "Ability to Bear Economic
Risk," 8 SEc. REG. L. J. 3, 4-5 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Soraghan].
45 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
49 Id. at 121.
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The company claimed the section 4(2) exemption based on their position that
the only purchasers were employees who took the initiative to invest in the
company and were, therefore, "key employees" in the organization. The Court
rejected Ralston Purina's contention" and also rejected the "number of offer-
ees" test urged by the SEC.51 Noting that "[t]he design of the statute is to
protect investors by promoting full disclosure of information thought necessary
to informed investment decisions, ' 52 the Court saw the availability of the pri-
vate offering exemption as turning on "the knowledge of the offerees."5 The
Court explained: "[t]he focus of inquiry should be on the need of the offerees
for the protection afforded by registration."" Language elsewhere in the opin-
ion disclosed that "[a]n offering to those who are shown to be able to fend for
themselves is a transaction 'not involving any public offering.' " The claimed
exemption in Ralston Purina failed because "[t]he employees here were not
shown to have access to the kind of information which registration would
disclose." 58
Despite the Court's awareness of the pertinent legislative history,57 it ex-
amined only the perceived needs of investors. Its failure to examine the inter-
ests of others affected by an offering of securities in reliance upon the exemp-
tion - the particular issuer and the business community in general -
effectively shifted the focus in private placements from the nature of the offer-
ing to the nature of the offerees.58
The references in the Ralston Purina decision to "those who are shown to
be able to fend for themselves," "the knowledge of the offerees," and "access to
the kind of information which registration would disclose" led, over time, to
judicial decisions which were difficult to digest. For example, a fair reading of
Ralston Purina suggests that the requisite "access" to information could be
demonstrated by either the offeree's position with the issuer or, alternatively,
by disclosure."" However, the Fifth Circuit case of.SEC v. Continental Tobacco
Co.60 effectively required a cumulative showing of both position and disclosure.
5* Id. at 126.
51 Id. at 125.
52 Id. at 124.
53 Id. at 126.
Id. at 127.
5' Id. at 125.
Id. at 127.
57 Id. at 122 & nn.5,6.
Soraghan, supra note 47, at 5.
59 "We agree that some employee offerings may come within § 4(1), e.g., one made to execu-
tive personnel who because of their position have access to the same kind of information that the
Act would make available in the form of a registration statement." SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346
U.S. 119, 125-26 (1953).
"The design of the statute is to protect investors by promoting full disclosure of information
thought necessary to informed investment decisions. ...
.[ t]he exemption question turns on the knowledge of the offerees .... The employees here
were not shown to have access to the kind of information which registration would disclose." Id. at
124-27.
6- 463 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972). See also Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, Inc.,
[Vol. 85
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And, although the Court strongly hinted that disclosure of appropriate infor-
mation to such presumably ordinary persons as the clerical assistants, stock
clerks, and stenographers who bought Ralston Purina's stock would have enti-
tled the company to the exemption,6 ' the Tenth Circuit in Lively v. Hirsch-
field62 held that a showing of "investment sophistication"6 3 is required. Given
the imprecision of the concepts of "access" and "sophistication," and the argu-
able lack of sufficiency of full disclosure, it is little wonder that the most active
of the courts of appeals, in the areas of section 4(2) exemption, noted that "the
cases cast at best a faint beacon toward the horizon of decision."'"
In 1974, the SEC adopted Rule 14665 for the stated purpose of providing
more objective standards for determining when offers and sales of securities by
an issuer would be deemed to be transactions not involving any public offering
within the meaning of section 4(2) of the Securities Act.6 6 In general, Rule 146
established certain conditions relative to an offer or sale of securities67 and
provided that transactions by an issuer made in accordance with all of the con-
ditions of the rule "shall be deemed to be transactions not involving any public
offering." 8 Rule 146 was expressly nonexclusive, and the issuers who were una-
ble to demonstrate total compliance could still claim the statutory exemption
if they had complied with applicable section 4(2) judicial and administrative
interpretations."
In very general fashion, the Rule 146 requirements, except those applica-
ble to business combinations, were as follows:
1. Limitation on Manner of Offering
No general solicitation or advertising could be used, except that letters
could be sent to "qualified" offerees and private meetings could be arranged
for "qualified" offerees.7°
2. Nature of Offerees
Before any offer was made, the issuer and its salesman had to actually
believe, upon reasonable grounds, that (a) each offeree had sufficient knowl-
edge and experience in financial and business matters to enable him to evalu-
ate the merits and risks of the prospective investment 1 - i.e., the offeree was
448 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1971).
61 SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 126-27 (1953).
62 440 F.2d 631 (10th Cir. 1971).
" Id. at 663.
e, Doran v. Petroleum Management Corp., 545 F.2d 893, 908 (5th Cir. 1977).
" Securities Act Release No. 5487, 39 Fed. Reg. 15,261 (1974) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.146
(1980)) (rescinded, effective June 30, 1982, in Securities Act Release No. 6398, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251
(1982)) [hereinafter cited as Rule 146].
66 Id.
67 Rule 146, supra note 65, at preliminary note 3.
48 Id. at § 230.146(b).
9 Id. at preliminary note 1.
70 Id. at § 230.146(e).
71 Id. at § 230.146(d)(1)(i).
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sophisticated - or (b) each offeree was able to bear the economic risk of the
investment 2 - an unprecedented standard.
3. Nature of Purchasers
Before making any sales, and after making reasonable inquiry, the issuer
and its salesman had to actually believe, upon reasonable grounds, that either
(a) the offeree was sophisticated,73 or (b) the offeree and an offeree representa-
tive - another new element - together were sophisticated, and the offeree was
able to bear the economic risk.7'
4. Access to or Furnishing of Information
Each offeree either had to have access, throughout the transaction and
prior to the sale, to certain specified information or, alternatively, be furnished
the pertinent information.7 6 Access existed under the rule only by reason of the
offeree's employment or family relationship with the issuer or by sufficient eco-
nomic bargaining power to enable the offeree to obtain the relevant informa-
tion.7 6 For those offerees who did not have access, the informational require-
ment could be discharged by furnishing the information to the offeree or an
offeree representative, if such adviser had been retained.7 7 Additionally,
whether or not an offeree had access to or was furnished the required informa-
tion, the issuer had to afford such offeree the opportunity to ask questions of,
and receive answers from, the issuer or its representative concerning the terms
and conditions of the offering and to obtain additional information, to the ex-
tent reasonably available, to enable verification of the required information. 7
5. Information Required
The information which an offeree had to have access to or which had to be
furnished to either him or his offeree representative was the "same kind of
information that is specified in Schedule A. . .to the extent that the issuer
possesses such information or can acquire it without unreasonable effort or ex-
pense.179 In the case of an issuer subject to the reporting requirements of the
Securities Exchange Act of 193480 ("the Exchange Act"), the informational re-
quirement could be discharged by providing documents already prepared for
other purposes,81 and additionally, "[a] brief description of the securities being
72 Id. at § 230.146(d)(1)(ii).
7 Id. at § 230.146(d)(2)(i).
7. Id. at § 230.146(d)(2)(ii).
75 Id. at § 230.146(e)(1).
11 Id. at § 230.146(e) NoTE.
77 Id. at § 230.146(e)(1)(ii).
78 Id. at § 230.146(e)(2).
79 Id. at § 230.146(e)(1)(i), (ii).10 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a to 78kk (1976).
"1 Rule 146, supra note 65, at § 230. 146(e)(1)(a)(1), required an issuer subject to the reporting
requirements of Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act to furnish offerees or offeree
representatives with:
The information contained in the annual report required to be filed under the Ex-
[Vol. 85
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offered, the use of the proceeds from the offering, and any material changes in
the issuer's affairs which are not disclosed in the documents furnished."' 2 All
other issuers, which included most users of Rule 146, had to provide the infor-
mation that would be required to be included in a public registration state-
ment on the form which the issuer would be entitled to use;83 however, imma-
terial details could be omitted, and information could be condensed so long as
the information provided was not rendered misleading.8 Also, the issuer not
subject to the reporting requirements of the Exchange Act could furnish
unaudited financial statements if the audited financial statements required by
the applicable registration form were not available without unreasonable effort
or expense.8 5 If unaudited financial statements were not available without un-
reasonable effort or expense, Regulation A financial statements could be fur-
nished.88 Moreover, if the aggregate sales price of all securities offered under
the rule did not exceed $1.5 million, the informational requirements could be
satisfied by furnishing the disclosure required by Schedule 1 of Regulation A
7
6. Number of Purchasers
Under Rule 146, the issuer had to have reasonable grounds to believe, and,
after making reasonable inquiry, had to actually believe that there were no
more than 35 purchasers of the issuer's security from the issuer in any offer-
ing."8 There were special rules for counting the number of purchasers,89 and,Rule 146 had its own "safe harbor" from integration" of the offering made in
change Act or a registration statement on Form S-1 under the Act or on Form 10 under
the Exchange Act, whichever filing is the most recent required to be filed, and the infor-
mation contained in any definitive proxy statement required to be fied pursuant to sec-
tion 14 of the Exchange Act and in any reports or documents required to be filed by the
issuer pursuant to section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Exchange Act, since the filing of such
annual report or registration statement.
81 Id. at § 230.146(e)(1)(a)(2).
8s Id. at § 230.146(e)(1)(b).
u Id. at § 230.146(e)(1)(b)(1).
88 Id. at § 230.146(e)(1)(b)(2).
88 Id.
87 Id. at § 230.146(e)(1)(d).
"8 Id. at 230.146(g)(1).81 Rule 146, supra note 65, at § 230.146(e)(1)(a)(1), excluded from the computation of pur-
chasers: (a) a purchaser's relative, spouse, or relative of the purchaser's spouse who had the same
home as the purchaser, (b) any trust or estate 100 percent beneficially owned by a purchaser or
excluded spouse, relative or spouse's relative, '(c) any corporation or other organization wholly
owned by a purchaser or related person, and (d) any person who purchased, or agreed in writing to
purchase, for cash, whether in a single payment or in installments, securities of the issuer in the
aggregate amount of $150,000 or more.
Rule 146, supra note 65, at § 230.146(e)(1)(a)(2), provided that a corporation, partnership,
association, joint stock company, trust or unincorporated organization was to be counted as one
purchaser, unless the entity was organized for the specific purpose of acquiring the securities of-
fered. If so, then each beneficial owner of equity interests or equity securities in the entity was
counted as a separate purchaser.
,o The doctrine of integration arose from the notion that an issuer should not be allowed to
circumvent registration requirements by stringing together a number of supposedly separate or
discrete transactions and claiming an exemption for each of the separate offerings. Thus, integra-
1982]
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reliance upon the rule with other securities offerings.'1
7. Limitations on Resale
The issuer, and each of its representatives, had to exercise reasonable care
to assure that each purchaser in the offering was not an underwriter within the
meaning of section 2(11) of the Securities Act." Such reasonable care included,
without limitation: (a) making reasonable inquiry to determine whether the
purchaser was acquiring the securities for his own account or for otherss (b)
placing a legend on the certificate indicating that the securities were unregis-
tered and setting forth or referring to the restrictions on transferability and
sale,9' (c) issuing stop transfer instructions to the transfer agent or, if the is-
suer transferred its own securities, annotating the transfer records,95 and (d)
obtaining a signed written agreement from each purchaser that the securities
would not be resold by the purchaser without registration or an appropriate
exemption.96 Additionally, although more in the nature of required informa-
tion, the issuer or its representative had to disclose to each purchaser in writ-
ing, before sale, that the economic risk of the investment had to be borne for
an indefinite period because the securities had not been registered and, there-
fore, could not be sold unless subsequently registered or unless an exemption
was available.97
tion is a "loophole closure" tool for securities administrators. See generally Integration of Part-
nership Offerings: A Proposal for Identifying a Discrete Offering, 37 Bus. LAW. 1591 (1982) (posi-
tion paper of Subcommittee on Partnerships, Trusts and Unincorporated Associations). In 17
C.F.R. § 230.146 preliminary note (1981), the SEC stated that, although whether a securities trans-
action is a discrete offering or a part of a larger offering is essentially a factual question, the rele-
vant factors are: (1) whether the offerings are part of a single part of financing, (2) whether the
offerings involve issuance of the same class of security, (c) whether the offerings are made at or
about the same time, (d) whether the same type of consideration is to be received, and (e) whether
the offerings are made for the same general purpose. 1 FED. SEc. L. RP. (CCH) 1 2781 (Nov. 6,
1962). Among the more noted cases dealing with the issue of integration are: In re Unity Gold
Corp. 3 S.E.C. 618 (1938) (leading case); SEC v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1980); Doran v.
Petroleum Management Corp., 545 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1977); and Livens v. William D. Witter, Inc.,
374 F. Supp. 1104 (D. Mass. 1974).
91 Rule 146, supra note 65, at § 230.146(b)(1) provided:
For purposes of this rule only, an offering shall be deemed not to include offers, offers to
sell, offers for sale or sales of securities of the issuer pursuant to the exemptions provided
by section 3 or section 4(2) of the Act or pursuant to a registration statement filed under
the Act, that take place prior to the six-month period immediately preceding or after the
six-month period immediately following any offers, offers for sale, or sales pursuant to
this rule. Provided, That there are during neither of said six month periods any offers,
offers for sale or sales of securities by or for the issuer of the same or similar class as
those offered, offered for sale or sold pursuant to the rule.
92 Id. at § 230.146(h).
93 Id. at § 230.146(h)(1).
" Id. at § 230.146(h)(2).
Id. at § 230.146(h)(3).
Id. at § 230.146(h)(4).
Id. at § 230.146(e)(3)(ii).
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8. Report of Offering
At the time of the first sale under the rule, the issuer had to file three
copies of a report (Form 146) at the appropriate SEC regional office, unless the
cumulative proceeds of all Rule 146 offerings during a twelve-month period
were less than $50,000.8 Amended reports had to be filed when any material
change occurred in the reported information."
Three primary points emerged from experience under Rule 146: (1) com-
pliance with the exemptive conditions was disproportionately burdensome
upon small issuers,'0 0 (2) the subjective nature of certain of the determinative
factors, e.g., sophistication and economic ability to bear the risk, rendered
qualification for the exemption uncertain,10 1 and (3) despite the express nonex-
clusivity of the rule, the effect of certain judicial decisions was to make the
Rule 146 exemptive criteria virtually determinative of the availability of the
underlying statutory exemption.02
B. Rule 240
Section 3(b) of the Securities Act 03 vests in the SEC the authority to cre-
ate exemptions from registration "by reason of the small amount involved or
the limited character of the public offering."'' As originally enacted, the spe-
cific dollar limitation was $100,000;105 however, the amount was raised from
time to time over the years.1°6
Early on, the SEC exercised its rulemaking authority by adopting a loose
series of rules designated collectively as Regulation A. These rules were later
repealed in favor of a uniform regulation, also termed Regulation A.107 In pub-
licly announcing its adoption of Regulation A in 1941, the SEC pronounced,
"[t]he new regulation shifts the Commission's administrative emphasis from
the disclosure requirements of the Act to the fraud prevention provisions."' 0 8
Accordingly, the original exemptive conditions for Regulation A were quite
simple and did not require the disclosure of any- specific information. 09 The
administrative screws were progressively tightened over time, however, in re-
98 Id. at § 230.146(i).
99 Id.
100 17 C.F.R. §§ 230 and 239 (background material).
101 Alberg & Lybecker, New SEC Rules 146 and 147: The Nonpublic and Intrastate Offering
Exemptions For the Sale of Securities, 74 COLUM. L. RPv. 622, 634-39 (1974); Cf. Soraghan, supra
note 47, at 20-34.
102 E.g., Woolf v. S. D. Cohn & Co., 515 F.2d 591, 614 (5th Cir. 1975). See also Schwartz, The
Private Offering Exemption - Recent Developments, 37 OHIo ST. L. J. 1 (1976).
103 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b)(1976).
104 Id.
105 1 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 605-06 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as Loss].
108 1 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) % 2351.001 (1982). The progression was as follows: $300,000
(1945); $500,000 (1970); $1,500,000 (1978); $2,000,000 (1978); $5,000,000 (1980) (historical
comment).
107 Loss, supra note 105, at 610.
108 Id.
10, Id.
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sponse to various publicized happenings regarding speculative securities. 10
Effective January 24, 1975,111 the SEC adopted Rule 240 " 2 pursuant to its
rulemaking authority under section 3(b) of the Securities Act. Like Rule 146,
Rule 240 was a nonexclusive "safe harbor" exemption from registration availa-
ble to issuers only." 3 Rule 240 proscribed general solicitation of purchasers and
general advertising in marketing securities issued pursuant to the rule,"' 4 re-
quired the issuer to exercise reasonable care to assure that the purchasers were
buying for investment instead of distribution," 5 required the filing of a notice
of sales form (Form 240)," and proscribed the. payment of commissions or
other remuneration for soliciting purchasers." 7 No specific information had to
be disclosed and offerees did not have to be screened for sophistication or
wealth. The purchaser limitation was framed in terms of the issuer's good faith
belief about the number of beneficial owners of the issuer's securities issued
pursuant to the rule." 8 The number was 100,' which was a potential advan-
tage over Rule 146, assuming the Rule 240 issuer had few security holders
before the offering. The great disadvantage of Rule 240 was the limitation
upon the aggregate sales price of unregistered securities of the issuer which
could be sold in a twelve-month period - $100,000.20 Thus, despite the reduced
burden of compliance and increased certainty of application of the Rule 240
exemption in contrast to Rule 146, Rule 240 was of little use to the small busi-
ness in need of venture capital due to the niggardly dollar limitation.
C. Rule 242
Rule 242121 was adopted by the SEC, effective February 25, 1980,122 also
pursuant to the SEC's rulemaking authority for small or limited offerings. Rule
242 introduced the concept of an accredited investor, which has been carried
over into Regulation D. An "accredited person,' 2 under Rule 242, was any
person who -the issuer and any person acting on its behalf had reasonable
grounds to believe, and did believe, after making reasonable inquiry, came
within one of the following three categories at the time of the Rule 242 sale: (a)
a bank, an insurance company, or certain other specified institutional inves-
tors, ' 2' (b) a "big ticket" or "fat cat" investor, i.e., one who purchased $100,000
:10 Id. at 610-12.
11 Securities Act Release No. 5560, 40 Fed. Reg. 6484, 6487 (1975).
112 17 C.F.R. § 230.240 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Rule 240].
113 Id. at preliminary note 4.
114 Rule 240, supra note 112, at § 230.240(c).
-- Id. at § 230.240(g).
11 Id. at § 230.240(h).
17 Id. at § 230.240(d).
I'8 Id. at § 230.240(f).
119 Id.
"0 Id. at § 230.240(e).
1 17 C.F.R. § 230.242 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Rule 242].
122 Securities Act Release No. 6180, 45 Fed. Reg. 6362 (1980).
122 Rule 242, supra note 121, at § 230.242(a)(1).
124 Id. at § 230.242(a)(1)(i).
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or more of the securities, 125 and (c) any director or executive officer of the is-
suer.1 26 Rule 242 was a nonexclusive exemption1 2 7 available only to United
States or Canadian corporationss1 2 8 with certain specified exclusions,12 ' notably
including Regulation A "bad boys."130 The great breakthrough with Rule 242,
regarding the SEC's exercise of its section 3(b) rulemaking authority, was set-
ting the aggregate offering price limitation at $2 million."1 The purchaser limi-
tation was framed in terms of purchasers of the particular offering, rather than
an outstanding security holder limitation a' la Rule 240, and was based on the
issuer's good faith belief that no more than 35 non-accredited persons had pur-
chased securities in the transaction.1 3 2 There was no limit upon the number of
accredited investors, nor were there any suitability criteria for non-accredited
purchasers. General solicitation and advertising were prohibited.1 "
No specific information had to be disclosed when the only purchasers were
accredited persons; however, when the purchasers included non-accredited per-
sons, the issuer had to disclose to all purchasers, in writing, the same kind of
information as that specified in Part I of Form S-18 (Form S-18 is used to
disclose information about registered securities),1 to the extent material to an
understanding of the issuer, its business and the securities being offered.12 5
The issuer must also provide any information necessary to make the expressly
required information not misleading 3 6 - a necessary anti-fraud corollary
whether stated in the rule or not. Exchange Act reporting companies utilizing
the Rule 242 exemption could satisfy the specific disclosure requirement
largely by furnishing documents required to be filed under the Exchange
Act, 7 plus certain additional information, if applicable." Additionally, each
offeree had to be extended the opportunity to ask questions and receive an-
swers regarding the offering and to obtain additional, reasonably available, in-
formation from the issuer to verify the accuracy of the information
mandatorily disclosed, all of which had to be done prior to sale.1 3 ' Also, at
,23 Id. at § 230.242(a)(1)(ii).
126 Id.
227 Rule 242, supra note 121, at preliminary note 3.
128 Id. at § 230.242(a)(5).
229 Rule 242 (a)(5), supra note 121, at § 230.242(a)(5), excluded from the definition of a "qual-
ified issuer": (i) an investment company, (ii) an issuer which engaged or intended to engage in oil
and gas operations which exceed the criteria for exemption specified in Regulation S-X, and (iii)
an issuer which was a majority-owned subsidiary of an issuer which did not qualify to use the rule.
230 17 C.F.R. § 230.252 (c)-(f), denied the Regulation A exemption to an issuer when any of a
long list of conditions applied. The conditions, in general terms, related to pending or previous
securities proceedings or violations against or by the issuer, its predecessors, affiliates, directors,
'officers and owners. Hence the term "bad boys" or "bad guys."
131 Rule 242, supra note 121, at § 230.242(c).
22 Id. at § 230.242(e)(1).
223 Id. at § 230.242(d).
134 Id. at § 230.242(f)(1)(i).
125 Id.
226 Id. at § 230.242(f)(1)(ii).
227 Id. at § 230.242(f)(1)(iii).
138 Id.
13, Id. at § 230.242(0(2).
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some reasonable time prior to sale of Rule 242 securities to a non-accredited
person, the issuer had to furnish to such prospective purchaser a brief written
description of any written information obtained by any accredited person and,
if the prospective non-accredited purchaser so requested in writing, the issuer
had to actually furnish such information. 140
Securities acquired pursuant to a Rule 242 transaction had the same re-
stricted status as securities acquired in a private placement. 1, Accordingly,
"reasonable care" limitations were imposed on the resale of the securities simi-
lar to those applicable to Rule 146.142 Finally, a notice of sales form (Form 242)
had to be filed with the SEC within 10 days after the first sale,14' within 10
days after the final sale,' 4 and periodically throughout the offering.145
In summary, prior to the adoption of Regulation D, the rules which it re-
placed, in very general terms, permitted the sale of unregistered securities as
follows:
1. Rule 240 permitted the sale of up to an aggregate of $100,000 in a
twelve-month period to up to 100 security holders, without requiring any spe-
cific information to be disclosed, so long as no commissions or the like were
paid."46
2. Rule 242 permitted American or Canadian corporations to sell $2 mil-
lion per transaction to up to 35 persons who were free of suitability criteria
and, additionally, an unlimited number of institutional investors, big ticket
purchasers, or insiders. When only accredited purchasers were involved, no
specific information had to be disclosed; otherwise, material information in the
format of Part I of Form S-18 had to be disclosed in writing. In every case
prospective investors were entitled to ask questions and get such additional,
reasonably available information as they deemed appropriate. 47
3. Rule 146 permitted the sale of an unlimited dollar amount of securities
to up to 35 purchasers who were either sophisticated-however the issuer
dared interpret that concept-or were able to achieve sophistication with the
help of a representative and were able to bear the economic risk-however, the
issuer dared interpret that. Big ticket purchasers and family members or sub-
sidiaries of other purchasers did not count against the limit. Offerees had to be
either sophisticated or able to bear the risk, irrespective of whether they pur-
chased. The manner of offering was limited. Information similar to that re-
quired in a registration statement had to be disclosed to each offeree, or else
the offeree had to have a special relationship with the issuer.1 48
140 Id. at § 230.242(f)(3).
4 Id. at § 230.242(g).
142 Id.
143 Id. at § 230.242(h)(1)(i).
144 Id. at § 230.242(h)(1)(ii).
'15 Id. at § 230.242(h)(1)(iii).
141 See supra text accompanying notes 111-20.
147 See supra text accompanying notes 121-45.
141 See supra text accompanying notes 65-99.
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Conditions common to all three exemptions were that (a) the exemptions
were not exclusive, (b) no general solicitation of purchasers was allowed, (c)
subsequent disposition of the securities was restricted, and (d) notice of sales
forms had to be filed.1
4 9
II.
Regulation D consists of six rules, 501 through 506.150 The first three con-
tain definitions and general conditions applicable to the exemptive rules.151
The last three contain specific exemptive conditions which vary according to
the aggregate size of the offering. 5' Like the rules which it replaced, the safe
harbor of Regulation D as an exemption from registration is available only to
issuers'53 and only when each of the relevant conditions is satisfied.1 4
Rule 501155 sets forth an expanded definition of accredited investor,156 es-
"1 See supra text accompanying notes 65-99, 111-45.
150 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-.506 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Rules].
,51 Rules supra note 150, at § 230.501-.503.
" Id. at § 230.504-.506.
151 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251 (1982). Preliminary Note 4 to Regulation D.
,14 Rules, supra note 150, at §§ 230.504(b), 230.505(b), 230.506(b).
" Id. at § 230.501.
,56 Rule 501(a) defines an "accredited investor" as any person who comes within any of the
following categories, or who the issuer reasonably believes comes within any of the following cate-
gories, at the time of the sale of the securities to that person:
(1) Any bank as defined in section 3(a)(2) of the Act whether acting in its individual
or fiduciary capacity; insurance company as defined in section 2(13) of the Act; invest-
ment company registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940 or a business de-
velopment company as defined in section 2(a)(48) of that Act; Small Business Invest-
ment Company licensed by the U. S. Small Business Administration under section 301(c)
or (d) of the Small Business Investment Act of 1958; employee benefit plan within the
meaning of Title I of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, if the in-
vestment decision is made by a plan fiduciary, as defined in section 3(21) of such Act,
which is either a bank, insurance company, or registered investment adviser, or if the
employee benefit plan has total assets in excess of $5,000,000;
(2) Any private business development company as defined in section 202(a)(22) of
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940;
(3) Any organization described in section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code
with total assets in excess of $5,000,000;
(4) Any director, executive officer, or general partner of the issuer of the securities
being offered or sold, or any director, executive officer, or general partner of a general
partner of that issuer;
(5) Any person who purchases at least $150,000 of the securities being offered, where
the purchaser's total purchase price does not exceed 20 percent of the purchaser's net
worth at the time of sale, or joint net worth with that person's spouse, for one or any
combination of the following: (i) cash, (ii) securities for which market quotations are
readily available, (iii) an unconditional obligation to pay cash or securities for which
market quotations are readily available which obligation is to be discharged within five
years of the sale of the securities to the purchaser, or (iv) the cancellation of any indebt-
edness owed by the issuer to the purchaser;
(6) Any natural person whose individual net worth, or joint net worth with that
person's spouse, at the time of his purchase exceeds $1,000,000;
(7) Any natural person who had an individual income in excess of $200,000 in each
of the two most recent years and who reasonably expects an income in excess of $200,000
1982]
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tablishes rules for computing the aggregate offering price'5 and for calculating
the number of purchasers, 158 and contains other relevant definitions. 159 Rule
502160 contains the integration rules for a Regulation D offering,16 ' sets forth
when and what information is required to be disclosed,1 6 2 and establishes limi-
tations upon the manner of offering and resale.16 3 Rule 503164 provides for the
in the current year; and
(8) Any entity in which all of the equity owners are accredited investors under para-
graph (a)(1),(2),(3),(4),(6), or (7) of this § 230.501.
Id. at § 230.501(a).
,57 Rule 501(c) defines "aggregate offering price" as the sum of all cash, services, property,
notes, cancellation of debt, or other consideration received by an issuer for issuance of its securi-
ties. The rule then provides that where securities are being offered for both cash and non-cash
consideration, the aggregate offering price shall be based on the price at which the securities are
offered for cash; but, if securities are not offered for cash, the aggregate offering price shall be
based on the value of the consideration as established by bona fide sales of that consideration
made within a reasonable time, or, in the absence of sales, on the fair value as determined by an
accepted standard. Id. at § 230.501(c).
'" Rule 501(e)(1) excludes from the computation of the number of purchasers: (i) any rela-
tive, spouse or relative of the spouse of a purchaser who has the same principal residence as the
purchaser; (ii) any trust or estate more than 50 per cent beneficially owned by a purchaser or
related person; (iii) any corporation or other organization of which a purchaser and related persons
are beneficial owners of more than 50 per cent of the equity securities or equity interests; and (iv)
any accredited investor. Rule 501(e)(2) counts as one purchaser a corporation, partnership or other
entity unless the entity is organized for the specific purpose of acquiring the securities being of-
fered and all equity owners are not accredited investors, in which case each beneficial owner of
equity securities or equity interests in the entity counts as a separate purchaser. Id. at §
230.501(e)(1) - .501(e)(2).
15 I.e., "Affiliate," id. at § 230.501(b); "Business combination," id. at § 230.501(d); "Executive
officer," id. at § 230.501(f); "Issuer," id. at 230.501(g); and "Purchaser representative," id. at §
230.501(g).
110 Id. at § 230.502.
,"I Rule 502(a) provides that offers and sales that are made more than six months before the
start of a Regulation D offering or are made more than six months after completion of a Regula-
tion D offering will not be considered part of that Regulation D offering, so long as during those six
month periods there are no offers or sales of securities by or for the issuer that are of the same or a
similar class as those offered or sold under Regulation D, other than those offers and sales of
securities under an employee benefit plan as defined in Rule 405 under the Securities Act. Id. at §
230.502(a).
"'Id. at § 230.502(b).
' Rule 502(c) proscribes offering or selling the securities by any form of general solicitation
or general advertising, including, but not limited to (1) any advertisement, article, notice or other
communication published in any newspaper, magazine or similar media or broadcast over televi-
sion or radio; and (2) any seminar or meeting whose attendees have been invited by any general
solicitation or general advertising. An exception is made for a Rule 504 offering made exclusively in
states requiring registration of the securities and delivery of a disclosure document before sale. Id.
at § 230.502(c).
Rule 502(d) provides that securities acquired in a Regulation D transaction have the same
restricted status of securities acquired in a private placement under section 4(2) of the Securities
Act. Accordingly, the rule proscribes the resale of the securities without registration or an available
exemption, and mandates that the issuer exercise reasonable care to assure that the purchasers are
not underwriters (i.e., are not buying with a view toward distribution), including (1) reasonable
inquiry to determine if the purchaser is acquiring the securities for himself or for other persons, (2)
written pre-sale disclosure to each purchaser that the securities have not been registered under the
Securities Act and, therefore, cannot be resold unless they are so registered or an exemption from
registration is available, and (3) legending the certificate to the effect that the securities are unre-
16
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filing of a notice of sales form (Form D) initially and periodically thereafter
until the offering is completed,'1 5 and, with respect to Rule 505 offerings only,
Rule 503 requires that the notice contain an undertaking by the issuer to fur-
nish to the SEC, upon request, the information furnished to non-accredited
investors.166
Rule 504167 contains the specific exemptive conditions for "limited offers
and sales of securities not exceeding $500,000. ''118 Investment companies and
Exchange Act reporting companies cannot use Rule 504.169 Otherwise, to qual-
ify for the exemption, the issuer must satisfy only the general conditions of
Rules 501 through 503.170 But, if the securities are offered and sold exclusively
in states which require registration and pre-sale delivery of a disclosure docu-
ment, the limitations upon the manner of the offering and resale are not appli-
cable. 1 ' No specific informational disclosure requirement exists under a Rule
504 offering; there is no limitation upon the number of purchasers and no pur-
chaser suitability standards. However, there is to be aggregated with the sales
price of the offering the total offering price for all securities sold in reliance
upon any section 3(b) exemption or in violation of section 5(a) of the Securities
Act within twelve months preceding the commencement and completion of the
Rule 504 offering.172
Rule 505,'173 entitled "Exemption for limited offers and sales of securities
not exceeding $5,000,000, ''174 is available to all issuers except investment com-
panies . 1 7 5 The $5,000,000 aggregate offering price1 76 is the subject of an aggre-
gation rule like that applicable to Rule 504.177 Rule 505 is limited to no more
than 35 non-accredited purchasers, who do not have to meet any express suita-
bility standards. '78 An unlimited number of accredited investors can partici-
pate in a Rule 505 offering. The information which must be disclosed is spelled
gistered and setting forth or referring to the restrictions on resale. An exemption is made for a
Rule 504 offering made exclusively in states requiring registration of the securities and delivery,
prior to sale, of a disclosure document. Id. at § 230.502(d).
36 Id. at § 230.503.
', Rule 503(a) requires the issuer to file with the SEC five copies of a notice on Form D (1) no
later than 15 days after the first sale, (2) every six months after the first sale, unless the final
notice has been filed, and (3) no later than 30 days after the last sale. Id. at § 230.503(a).
"I Id. at § 230.503(d).
167 Id. at § 230.504.
168 Id.
36 Id. at § 230.504(a).
170 Id. at § 230.504(b)(1).
173 Id.
371 Id. at § 230.504(b)(2)(i).
173 Id. at § 230.505.
174 Id.
,71 Id. at § 230.505(a).
176 Id.
1" Compare 17 C.F.R. § 230.505(b)(2)(i) (1982) with 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b)(2)(i) (1982). (Both
rules require that the aggregate offering price be below a specified amount in order for the exemp-
tion to be valid; $5,000,000 in Rule 505, and $500,000 in Rule 504).
178 Rules, supra note 150, at § 230.505(b)(2)(ii).
1982]
17
Russell: A Proposed West Virginia Response to the Initiative of Regulation
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1982
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85
out in Rule 502(b)"79 in detail. Essentially, the Rule 505 non-accredited inves-
tor must receive the same information as would be required in Form S-18, if
that form can be used by the issuer, or Part I of an applicable registration
statement;180 however, some leeway is provided to delete immaterial
information.181
Rule 506,182 which replaces Rule 146, is available to any issuer.183 Like
Rule 505, there is a "good faith" limitation to 35 non-accredited purchasers,18'
however, there is an additional requirement, carried over from Rule 146,183 that
the Rule 506 non-accredited investor, either alone or with his purchaser repre-
sentative, be sophisticated.1 18 The "ability to bear the economic risk" test of
Rule 146 has been deleted. Consistent with the tiered informational scheme of
Regulation D, the Rule 506 issuer must furnish to each non-accredited investor
the same kind of information as would be required in Part I of a registration
statement filed under the Securities Act on the form which the issuer would be
entitled to use.187
The informational requirements for Exchange Act reporting companies are
the same for both Rule 505 and Rule 506188 and are similar to those for report-
ing companies under old Rule 146.189 Further, under both Rules 505 and 506,
any issuer must furnish to non-accredited investors, prior to sale, a written
description of any written information provided to any accredited investor and,
Id. at § 230.502(b).
180 Id. at § 230.502(b)(2)(i)(A).
" Rule 502(b)(2)(i), which controls the type of information to be furnished by an issuer not
subject to the reporting requirements of section 13 or 15(d) of the Exchange Act, requires the
specified information be furnished "to the extent material to an understanding of the issuer, its
business and the securities being offered." Id. at § 230.502(b)(2)(i).
182 Id. at § 230.506.
183 Id. at § 230.506(a).
184 Id. at § 506(b)(2)(i).
18 See supra text accompanying note 73.
's Rule 506(b)(2)(ii) requires the issuer to "reasonably believe immediately prior to making
any sale that each purchaser who is not an accredited investor either alone or with his purchaser
representative(s) has such knowledge and experience in financial and business matters that he is
capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective investment." Rule, supra note 150 at
§ 230.506(b)(2)(ii).
'" Id. at § 230.502(b)(2)(i)(B).
'88 Rule 502(b)(2)(ii) requires the issuer subject to the reporting requirements of section 13 or
15(d) of the Exchange Act to furnish either (A) the issuer's annual report to the shareholders for
the most recent fiscal year (if the annual report meets certain conditions), the definitive proxy
statement filed in connection with that annual report, and, if requested by the purchaser in writ-
ing, a copy of the issuer's most recent Form 10-K under the Exchange Act; or (B) the information
contained in an annual report on Form 10-K or in a registration statement on Form S-1, whichever
filing is the most recent required to be filed; and, in either event, (C) the information contained in
any reports or documents required to be filed by the issuer under sections 13(a), 14(a), 14(c), and
15(d) of the Exchange Act since the distribution or filing of the report or registration statement
specified in (A) or (B), and a brief description of the securities being offered, the use of the pro-
ceeds from the offering, and any material changes in the issuer's affairs that are not disclosed in
the documents furnished. Id. at § 230.506(b)(2)(ii).
" Compare Rule 502(b)(2)(ii) with Rule 146(e)(1)(a)(1), supra note 81. (See supra text ac-
companying notes 81, 82).
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if requested in writing, must actually furnish that information to the non-ac-
credited investor.'90 Moreover, under both rules, the issuer must extend to
each purchaser, whether accredited or non-accredited, at a reasonable time
prior to sale, the opportunity to ask questions, receive answers and obtain ad-
ditional information, to the extent such additional information is reasonably
available to the issuer.
19 1
Although definitive commentary upon the extent to which the SEC accom-
plished its goals with Regulation D must await the workings of the courts and
administrative interpretations, certain initial observations are in order. The
Rule 504 exemption should prove to be salutary in that it results in simplified
disclosure requirements, imposes no specific suitability standards and contains
no limitation upon the number of purchasers. The aggregation rules potentially
limit Rule 504's usefulness but the aggregate sales price limitation under Rule
504 is nevertheless five times greater than that of its immediate predecessor,
Rule 240. The absence of any specific disclosure requirement may actually cre-
ate a quandary for the promoter, however, because Rule 504 is an exemption
from registration only, it is not an exemption from the anti-fraud provisions.'92
The marketing of any security these days requires some disclosure, and, in or-
der to avoid having the disclosed information found to be misleading due to
the absence of other information, the diligent promoter must always consider
"spilling his guts.'' 9 3 Thus, the simplified disclosure requirement may not be
so simple. Nonetheless, the SEC seems to have enhanced the process of capital
formation for the small venture via Rule 504, however, the response of the
states to the initiative will determine the extent to which simplification is
achieved in reality.'9 4
The general nature of the tiered informational requirements of Rules 505
and 506, conceptually at least, evidence an attempt by the SEC to balance the
needs of investors and issuers. 9 Such a cost-benefit approach seems true to
the wishes of Congress. 96 The absence of a sophistication test for non-accred-
,90 Rules, supra note 150, at § 230.502(b)(2)(ii).
191 Id. at § 230.502(b)(2)(v).
192 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251 (1982). Preliminary Note 1 to Regulation D.
193 See generally Mosburg, supra note 35, at 84-103.
19' Because Regulation D provides an exemption from registration under the federal Securities
Act only, state registration or exemption-qualification requirements, to the extent incompatible
with the Regulation D exemption, will negate the advantages achieved under Regulation D.
195 "Regulation D is the product of the Commission's evaluation of the impact of its rules and
regulations on the ability of small businesses to raise capital. This study has revealed a particular
concern that the registration requirements and the exemptive scheme of the Securities Act impose
disproportionate restraints on small issuers. Securities Act Release No. 6389, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251
(1982) (footnote omitted). The new regulation is designed to simplify and clarify existing exemp-
tions, to expand their availability, and to achieve uniformity between federal and state exemptions
in order to facilitate capital formation consistent with the protection of investors." Id.
196 The House Report on the Small Business Investment Incentive Act of 1980 (Pub. L. No.
96-477, 94 Stat. 2275 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.)) provided: "As but one means of
dealing with the more general problem, this Bill seeks specifically to reduce some of the costs of
government regulation imposed on the capital-raising process, to the extent that it can be done
without sacrificing necessary investor protection." H.R. REP. No. 1341, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 20
(1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4800, 4802.
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ited investors in Rule 505 enables the issuer to avoid federal problems with
purchasers of marginal investment acumen. Likewise, the comparatively less
stringent informational requirements of Rule 505 affords the issuer an alterna-
tive to the more stringent requirements of Rule 506; however, state disclosure
requirements could dilute the advantage. The dollar limitation of Rule 505 is a
disadvantage in comparison to Rule 506, but, then again, $4,999,999.99 is not
chicken feed, even in these inflationary times. A possible hidden disadvantage
of Rule 505 is that, because it is based on section 3(b) rather than section 4(2),
it is presumably subject to the Federal Reserve Board's Regulation T197 restric-
tions upon the use of leveraging techniques.159 Due to the extreme significance
of leverage199 in real estate offerings, this potential disadvantage is significant.
Rule 506, the new section 4(2) exemption, has retained the exemptive cri-
teria of Rule 146, except for the "ability to bear the economic risk" test with
respect to non-accredited investors and the express need to qualify offerees;
however, the cautious promoter will appreciate the foolhardiness of totally dis-
regarding the investment acumen and financial ability of every potential inves-
tor. Accordingly, the supposed simplification of qualification under Rule 506 in
contrast to former Rule 146 is relative only, but, by the same token, the "needs
of the issuer" argument begins to break down when more than $5,000,000 is
being raised. The major advantages of Rule 506 are the absence of a dollar
limitation and the absence of the aggregation rules applicable to Rule 504 and
506.
The chief importance of Regulation D in the context of an analysis of the
West Virginia Uniform Securities Act2 00 is the background of cooperation be-
tween the SEC and the Small Business Financing Subcommittee of NASAA in
the development of Regulation D and NASAA's proposed Uniform Limited Of-
fering Exemption and, especially, the assumptions of those bodies with respect
197 12 C.F.R. §§ 220.1-.130 (1982).
"0 Regulation T essentially provides that unregistered securities have no loan value; conse-
quently, a federal bank or other lending institution subject to the rules and regulations of the
Federal Reserve Board cannot extend credit to a limited partnership or other tax-shelter program
for the purpose of enabling the limited partners or investors to purchase or carry the securities.
That limitation does not apply, however, when the security transaction is exempt from the regis-
tration requirements of the Securities Act by virtue of section 4(2) of the Act. 12 C.F.R. §§
220.7(a)(2), 220.8, 220.124 (1982).
"I Leverage, in a tax-shelter real estate program, is the use of debt to achieve tax benefits in
excess of an investor's initial cash contribution. For example, if a limited partner of a real estate
limited partnership purchases a $100 limited partnership unit for $1 cash and a $99 promissory
note, he may be able to claim and achieve tax benefits (e.g., investment tax credit, depreciation,
deduction of losses, etc.) upon the basis of $100, which could yield current writeoffs several times
in excess of his actual cash contribution. The "at risk" provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1976
and the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 have somewhat tempered the benefits of leverage,
however, by limiting the investor's current deductibility of losses and current use of the invest-
ment tax credit to the extent to which he is "at risk" on his contribution, e.g., the holder of the
note has recourse against the personal assets of the investor. Weiler, The "At Risk" Rules: A New
Consideration for Tax Shelter Investments and Partnership, NYU TmRTY-SIxTH ANNUAL INSTI-
TU' E ON FEDERAL TAXATION 1351, 1356 (1978); Messinger, Developments and Anomalies in the At-
Risk Rules, NYU FORTIETH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL TAXATION 18-1 (1982).
200 W. VA. CODE §§ 32-1-101 to 32-4-418 (1982).
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to the future of relevant regulation. The Uniform Limited Offering Exemption
recommended by NASAA to its members, in terms, relates only to Rule 505.201
It is silent with respect to Rules 504 and 506. The assumption behind the
scheme was that offerings below $500,000 would be primarily regulated by the
states upon the premise that offerings below that amount represent local
financings. 20 2 In that regard, SEC Rule 504 exists to establish minimal investor
protections in the event an issuer is able to evade state regulation.'" Rule 505
and the NASAA proposed Uniform Limited Offering Exemption are designed
to subject intermediate-size offerings to compatible federal and state regula-
tion and, if the uniform exemption is implemented in a substantial number of
states, nearly uniform state exemptions.204 The proposed uniform exemption
contains optional conditions so as to accommodate differing regulatory philoso-
phies of the various states,205 but subject to those conditions, the design is to
achieve a fully coordinated state and federal exemption for intermediate offer-
ings. The Uniform Limited Offering Exemption contains no provisions for of-
ferings in excess of $5,000,000. Earlier drafts of the uniform exemption did
cover Rule 506, as initially proposed, but the relevant provisions were deleted
"not because of any flaws in the exemption or negative judgments by the com-
mittee, but merely that ... it seemed beyond the small business scope of the
committee." 20 6 Thus, the clear assumption of NASAA was that large offerings
would be principally federally regulated. Given the proliferation of exemptive
rules promulgated by a federal agency and forty-nine states, it is clearly appro-
priate and hopefully beneficial for small offerings to be regulated locally, for
intermediate offerings to be regulated in a compatible manner by state and
federal governments, and for large offerings to be federally regulated.
III.
State "blue sky" laws predated the enactment of the Securities Act in
1933.207 Unlike other examples of significant federal regulation pursuant to the
Commerce Clause,208 state regulation of securities transactions was not pre-
empted by the Securities Act. 209 Perhaps that was a mistake because a major
feature of securities regulation in the United States since then has been the
2" Mosburg, supra note 35, at 457.
202 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251 (1982).
203 Id.
204 Id.; Mosburg, supra note 35, at 453.
205 Mosburg, supra note 35, at 455.
200 Memorandum from E. C. Mackey, Chairman, Small Business Finance Subcommittee to
NASAA Members (October 2, 1981), reprinted in 12TH ANNUAL PRIVATE REAL ESTATE SYNDICA-
TIONs 338-39 (Augustine, Fass, Turner and Zarrow eds. 1982) (available from Law Journal Semi-
nars-Press, Inc., New York, N.Y.).
207 Long, State Securities Regulation - An Overview, 32 OKLA. L. REV. 541 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as Long].
208 E.g., the Motor Carrier Act of 1940 was held to preclude states from suspending an inter-
state carrier's right to use their highways for violations of state highway regulations in Castle v.
Hayes Freight Lines, 348 U.S. 61 (1954). See generally Note, Pre-Emption As A Preferential
Ground: A New Canon of Construction, 12 STAN. L. REv. 208 (1959).
209 15 U.S.C. § 77r (1976).
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redundancy of multiple regulatory regimes. The "blue sky" laws also require
securities to be registered before they are offered for sale, unless an exemption
from registration is available. 210 In this context, an offering made only in one
state may qualify for the federal exemption of section 3(a)(11) of the Securities
Act; however, the courts and the SEC have rendered reliance on the intrastate
exemption an extremely risky proposition.2 11 The difficulties with the intra-
state exemption are particularly applicable in West Virginia, where most of the
metropolitan areas from which securities offerings are likely to emanate are
located at or relatively near the borders of adjoining states.21 2
There is some form of exemption from registration for a limited offering in
the vast majority of the states. 13 These exemptions are generally of the follow-
ing varieties: (1) exemptions framed by the number of offerees21' or the num-
ber of buyers, 1 5 (2) exemptions framed by the number of outstanding security
holders of the issuer,218 (3) exemptions dually framed by the number of buyers
and/or a dollar amount,217 and (4) an "isolated transaction" exemption.2 18
Some state statutes have more than one of these variants.21 9 Additionally, the
statutes of many states proscribe 2 0 or limit 221 the payment of commissions or
other remuneration in connection with an exempted offering.
The present West Virginia statute ("the Act") is a version of the Uniform
Securities Act 222 and was enacted in 1974228 without substantial modification
from the draft approved by the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws and the American Bar Association in 1956. The Act is divided into
four principal parts:224 Article 1225 dealing with fraudulent and other prohib-
ited practices; Article 2228 dealing with the registration of broker-dealers,
agents and investment advisers; Article 3227 dealing with the registration of se-
210 E.g., W. VA. CODE § 32-3-301 (1982).
211 See Alberg & Lybecker, New SEC Rules 146 and 147: The Nonpublic and Intrastate Of-
fering Exemptions For The Sale of Securities, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 622 (1974).
212 Several of the metropolitan areas of West Virginia are within five minutes of other states,
e.g., Huntington, Parkersburg, Wheeling, Morgantown, Martinsburg and Bluefield. Others are
within one hour of other states, e.g., Charleston, Beckley, Clarksburg and Fairmont. Thus, the
problem of controlling where an offering comes to rest is particularly acute.
213 Mofsky, supra note 3, at 276.
214 L. Loss, COMMENTARY ON THE UNIFORM SECURITIES AcT, 125-26 (1976).
215 Id. at 125.
210 Id. at 126.
217 Id.
40 Id. at 127.
210 Mofsky, supra note 3, at 278.
220 E.g., W. VA. CODE § 32-4-402(b)(9) (1982).
:21 See infra notes 269-70.
222 Tompkins, The Uniform Securities Act - A Step Forward In State Regulation, 77 W. VA.
L. REV. 15 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Tompkins].
22. Id. at 15 n.2.
224 Id. at 19.
226 W. VA. CODE §§ 32-1-101 to -102 (1982).
220 W. VA. CODE §§ 32-2-201 to -204 (1982).
221 W. VA. CODE §§ 32-3-301 to -306 (1982).
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curities; and Article 42' 8 which contains general provisions, including exemp-
tions from registration,'2 9 criminal2 30 and civil231 liabilities and the administra-
tion and enforcement of the Act.232
Section 301 of the Act is the conceptual counterpart of section 5 of the
Federal Securities Act and established the general rule that it is unlawful "for
any person to offer or sell any security in this State unless (1) it is registered
under this chapter or (2) the security or transaction is exempted under section
402. ' '233 Three methods of registration are provided: registration by notifica-
tion,2 3 ' registration by coordination2' 5 and registration by qualification.
2 3" Of
the three, registration by qualification, or "full-blown" registration, is the only
method which is always available. 237 Registration by coordination is available
for any security, the offering of which is being contemporaneously registered
under the Federal Securities Act.23 8 Registration by notification is of limited
usefulness for the primary issuance of securities by the fledgling enterprise,23 9
however, the apparent availability of this procedure for secondary transactions
in non-mineral securities potentially offers the purchaser of unregistered secur-
ities a means of liquidating his investment under state law, albeit at some ex-
pense.2 40 Registration by qualification is not effective until the commissioner of
securities 241 ("the Commissioner") so orders and, a registration statement pur-
suant to any of the methods remains effective for one year, unless the offering
continues for a longer period.
242
Section 402 of the Act24 3 grants exemptions from registration to twelve
types of securities 24 and to twelve types of transactions.2 4 5 As is the case with
:28 W. VA. CODE §§ 32-4-401 to -418 (1982).
22W W. VA. CODE § 32-4-402 (1982).
2:0 W. VA. CODE § 32-4-409 (1982).
,s, W. VA. CODE § 32-4-410 (1982).
232 W. VA. CODE §§ 32-4-406 to -408, -412, -413 (1982).
233 W. VA. CODE § 32-3-301 (1982).
234 W. VA. CODE § 32-3-302 (1982).
233 W. VA. CODE § 32-3-303 (1982).
216 W. VA. CODE § 32-3-304 (1982).
237 W. VA. CODE § 32-3-304(a) (1982), provides: "Any security may be registered by qualifi-
cation."
238 W. VA. CODE § 32-3-303(a) (1982).
239 Issuer registration by notification is limited to securities, other than a security with a fixed
maturity or a fixed interest or dividend provision, whose issuer and any predecessors have been in
continuous operation for at least five years if certain additional conditions are satisfied. W. VA.
CODE § 32-3-302(a)(1) (1982).
240 W. VA. CODE § 32-3-302(a)(2) (1982), authorizes registration by notification for:
Any security (other than a certificate of interest or participation in an oil, gas or mining
title or lease or in payments out of production under such a title or lease) registered for
non-issuer distribution if (A) any security of the same class has ever been registered
under this chapter or a predecessor act, or (B) the security being registered was origi-
nally issued pursuant to an exemption under this chapter or a predecessor act.
2" The Auditor is the ex officio Commissioner of Securities. W. VA. CODE § 32-4-406(a) (1982).
242 W. VA. CODE §§ 32-3-304(c), -305(i) (1982).
243 W. VA. CODE § 32-4-402 (1982).
24 W. VA. CODE § 32-4-402(a) (1982); see generally, Tompkins, supra note 222, at 34-35.
245 W. VA. CODE § 32-4-402(b) (1982); Tompkins, supra note 222, at 35-37.
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the Federal Securities Act, an exemption from registration does not constitute
an exemption from the anti-fraud provisions and the broker-dealer registration
provisions of the Act.246
The West Virginia limited offering exemption is found in section
402(b) (9)247 and is the literal duplicate of the version approved for adoption by
the states in 1956.218 As the draftsmen's commentary discloses, the approved
version of the limited offering exemption was the product of a substantial
number of redrafts and a great deal of discussion, with the result being a com-
promise palatable to those states which had no analogous exemption at all.110
The draftsmen, who felt that "some exemption along these lines is essential in
any well-ordered blue sky law . . .,,,250 rationalized the end result aptly:
"half .. .of a uniform loaf is better than none."2" ' Notwithstanding the exis-
tence of an arguably broader exemption under the previous West Virginia stat-
ute252 and the fact that a substantial number of other states which adopted a
variant of the Uniform Securities Act saw fit to increase the offeree limitation
above the number provided in the draft.253 West Virginia adopted the provi-
sion as written.
The exemption is as follows:
Any transaction pursuant to an offer directed by the offeror to not more
than ten persons (other than those designated in subdivision (8)) in this State
during any period of twelve consecutive months, whether or not the offeror or
any of the offerees is then present in this State, if (A) the seller reasonably
believes that all the buyers in this State (other than those designated in subdi-
vision (8)) are purchasing for investment, and (B) no commission or other re-
muneration is paid or given directly or indirectly for soliciting any prospective
buyer in this State (other than those designated in subdivision (8)); but the
commissioner may by rule or order, as to any security or transaction or any
type of security or transaction, withdraw or further condition this exemption,
or increase or decrease the number of offerees permitted, or waive the condi-
tions in clauses (A) and (B) with or without the substitution of a limitation on
remuneration.2'
The exemption has not yet been judicially construed in West Virginia.
Likewise, the Commissioner has not promulgated any rules related to the ex-
246 In terms, the exempted securities and exempt transactions relate only to the registration
requirement of section 301 of the Act and the requirement of section 403 of the Act to file with the
Commissioner, before use, any prospectus, circular or like sales literature intended for distribution
to prospective investors. W. VA. CODE § 32-4-402(a), (b) (1982).
247 W. VA. CODE § 32-4-402(b)(9) (1982).
248 Compare W. VA. CODE § 32-4-402(b)(9) (1982) with UNIFORM SECURITIES ACr (U.L.A.) §
402(b)(9).
249 L. Loss, COMMENTARY ON THE UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT 128 (1976).
220 Id.
251 Id.
252 See Tompkins, supra note 222, at 36 & n.68.
113 E.g., Ky. REV. STAT. § 292-410(1)(i) (1982) (25 offerees); MD. CoRPs. & AsS'NS CODE ANN. §
11-602(9) (Supp. 1981) (35 purchasers); OKLA. STAT. tit. 71, § 401(b)(9) (Supp. 1981-1982) (25
purchasers).
254 W. VA. CODE § 32-4-402(b)(9) (1982).
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emption, despite the statute's invitation for him to do so 2 55 Consequently, a
search for the precise scope of the exemption must begin and end with the
naked words of the statute and the few judicial decisions of other jurisdictions
construing similar exemptions.
The exemption is clearly conditioned upon the seller's reasonable belief
regarding the investment intent of the buyers and upon the absence of com-
missions or other payments for soliciting buyers; however, those conditions do
not apply if the buyer is a bank, savings institution, insurance company or any
of the other specified institutional investors,25 6 or if the buyer is a broker-
dealer.2 57 The limitation upon the number of persons clearly seems to focus
upon the number of offerees, including those who decide not to buy the secur-
ity, rather than the number of buyers. 58 The "offeree" orientation is difficult
to digest in the absence of limitations upon the manner of the offering. If the
legislature intended to create a state counterpart to the private offering ex-
emption of section 4(2) of the Federal Securities Act, it could have more
clearly expressed itself on the point.
Neither the offeror2 59 nor any of the offerees need be present in the State
for the exemptive conditions to apply, so long as the "transaction pursuant to
any offer," i.e., the offering, is "directed... in this State. ' 26 0 A reading of
Upton v. Trinidad Petroleum Corp.6 will quickly dispel any notions that the
exemption necessarily applies when no more than ten offers are made in West
Virginia. The occasion for constructional difficulty in this regard arises from
the location in the statute of the words "in this State." The Upton court,
which relied heavily on input from the Director of the Alabama Securities
Commission,282 effectively construed the identical Alabama exemption such
that the antecedent for "in this State" is "transaction," rather than "ten per-
sons." Another court has implicitly construed the statute in the contrary man-
ner,26 3 which seems more consistent with the expectations of the draftsmen.2
215 W. Va. Code § 32-4-402(b)(9) (1982) says, in part, "[t]he commissioner may by rule or
order... withdraw or further condition this exemption, or increase or decrease the number of of-
ferees permitted, or waive the conditions in clause (A) and (B). . .." Id. at § 32-4-402(b)(9).
256 The "persons" designated in subdivision (8) are "a bank, savings institution, trust com-
pany, insurance company, investment company as defined in the Investment Company Act of
1940, pension or profit-sharing trust, or other financial institution or institutional buyer, or...a
broker-dealer. . . ." W. VA. CODE § 32-4-402(b)(8) (1982).
257 W. VA. CODE § 32-4-401(c) (1982) defines a "broker-dealer" as "any person engaged in the
business of effecting transactions in securities for the account of others or for his own account."
258 Indeed, the statute expresses that it is the "number of offerees" on which the exemption
turns. W. VA. CODE § 32-4-402(b)(9) (1982).
259 Although the term "offeror" is not defined, it presumably embraces more than the issuer
and probably would be held to include anyone who acted on behalf of the issuer in effecting an
offer or sale of the issuer's securities. Cf. Hippensteel v. Karol, 159 Ind. App. 146, 304 N.E.2d 796
(1973).
210 W. VA. CODE § 32-4-402(b)(9) (1982).
261 468 F. Supp. 330 (N.D. Ala. 1979).
262 Id. at 335.
263 In re Information Resources Corp., 126 N.J. Super. 42, 312 A.2d 671 (1973).
214 "[Tjhere is no limit on the total number of offerees as long as it does not exceed ten 'in
this state'. .. ." L. Loss, COMMENTARY ON THE UNIFORM SECURiTzs AcT 129 (1976).
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Nevertheless, because of Upton, the cautious promoter who desires to raise
venture capital via the primary issuance of unregistered securities will rely
upon the 402(b)(9) exemption at his peril when the offering is directed to more
than ten persons and any one of those offers occurs in West Virginia.265 Upton
cannot be dismissed lightly as aberrant authority in the absence of action by
the legislature, the Commissioner or the courts. The resulting uncertainty ren-
ders the exemption unworkable.
The section 402(b)(9) proscription against the payment of commissions or
other remuneration for soliciting buyers is not unusual.26 The apparent pur-
pose of such prohibitions in "blue sky" laws is to prevent a dilution of the
investors' equity267 - a salutary purpose - but, in the absence of definitional
content in the West Virginia statute regarding who cannot be paid for what,
the wisdom of the prohibition is questionable if it purports to prevent the pay-
ment of commissions to registered broker-dealers or investment bankers. Given
the manifest complexities inherent in effecting an unregistered offering of se-
curities under federal and state regulation, securities professionals are emi-
nently better qualified than the typical promoter of a business venture to engi-
neer the offering and place the securities with suitable investors from among
their clients or contacts. Moreover, the investment industry's suitability rules
tend to deter an ill-matching of investor with investment when broker-dealers
subject to the various rule-making bodies are involved.2 ,
An alternative exists. Other states such as Ohio269 and Virginia270 permit
the payment of brokerage commissions but control the amount and limit the
payment to broker-dealers who are registered in the state. Presumably, disclo-
sure of the fact of participation of a broker-dealer or an investment banker and
the amount of his fee is deemed to be adequate protection for investors in
those states and, it is submitted, such practice could indirectly lead to compet-
itive fees with consequent benefit to the investor and the issuer2 71 In any
event, the dilution of the investor's equity which results from the compensa-
tion of a securities professional for his services should be less detrimental to
the public in the long-run than the potential consequences of denying his ser-
vices to the promoter. There is no societal benefit in forcing the promoter of a
fledgling enterprise to grope in the dark for investors once he has exhausted
his friends and acquaintances, when the supervening law imposes devastating
liability upon innocent mistakes. Consequently, either by administrative rule
" As W. VA. CODE § 32-4-414(a) (1982) clearly discloses, the registration requirement of the
Act does not turn on whether an investor or an issuer is a resident of this state. Rather, the regis-
tration requirement applies when an offer to sell is made, or an offer to buy is made and accepted,
in West Virginia. Hence, the availability of an exemption from registration should turn on the
number of offers to sell that are made, and offers to buy that are made and accepted, in West
Virginia; and, as W. VA. CODE § 32-4-414(c) (1982) discloses, neither party must be physically
located in West Virginia when the offer occurs.
260 Mofsky, supra note 3, at 278.
287 Id.
288 See Soraghan, supra note 47, at 22, 23.
269 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1707.03(O)(5) and (6), (Q) (2) and (3) (Page Supp. 1981).
270 VA. CODE § 13.1-514(b)(8) (Supp. 1982).
71 Mofsky, supra note 3, at 279.
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or by amendment to the statute, it should be made clear that brokerage com-
missions paid to registered broker-dealers are permissible.
The most deplorable aspect of the West Virginia limited offering exemp-
tion is that the Commissioner has not clarified the application of the exemp-
tion or sought to make it more workable by administrative rule. The statute
clearly gives him the authority to do so, and the draftsmen of the Uniform
Securities Act expected that the authority would be utilized.27 2 For example,
the Official Comment to section 402(b)(9) of the Uniform Securities Act states
that "[t]he figure ten is in substance only a prima facie figure. '273 If the Com-
missioner's purpose in leaving the scope of the exemption uncertain and un-
workable is to prompt the diligent promoter to register, he has missed the
mark. The function of registration is the disclosure of information deemed ap-
propriate to an informed investment decision. As the federal experience clearly
discloses, securities administrators can require the disclosure of information by
conditioning an exemption in that manner.17 Moreover, the Commissioner
would not lose his influence or his ability to protect the public by making an
exemption from registration more certain and more workable because, unlike
the SEC, he has the express power to regulate the merits of an offering,
whether registered or exempt, irrespective of the sufficiency of compliance with
disclosure requirements.278 Therefore, the Commissioner's abrogation of his au-
thority to clarify and make more workable the exact application of the limited
offering exemption by interpretative rules is particularly disappointing.
IV.
The SEC's invitation to the states to principally regulate small offerings of
securities and NASAA's proposed Uniform Limited Offering Exemption for in-
termediate size offerings provide an initiative to improve the present West Vir-
ginia limited offering exemption. Given the uncertain and restrictive nature of
the West Virginia exemption, the need to do so is clear. The substantial policy
question is how to proceed. The answer to that question can be found in the
principal distinction between the federal Securities Act and state blue sky
laws. State securities administrators have substantive authority to regulate the
merits of securities offered for sale in their states, notwithstanding compliance
with the disclosure requirements of a registration statement or an available
exemption.27 6 Federal administrators have no such authority.
State blue sky laws were, in essence, the first consumer protection stat-
utes. 277 Early definitions of the word "security" in state securities laws were
generally limited to the traditional forms of securities, such as stocks and
bonds. In response to the questionable investment schemes which arose during
World War I and thereafter, the definition of a security was expanded to fash-
272 L. Loss, COMMENTARY ON THE UNIFORM SECURITIES AcT 128-29 (1976).
27 Id. at 124.
274 See, e.g., supra note 188.
275 W. VA. CODE § 32-3-306(a)(E), (F) (1982).
276 Long, supra note 207, at 548.
27 Id. at 543.
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ion a remedy. 78 As a result of this evolutional process, state securities laws
were able to squelch such schemes as the fraudulent sale of commodity option
contracts,279 the Glenn Turner "Ponzi" schemes,28 0 pyramid arrangements in
the sale of memberships in discount department stores,28 1 and worm farms.282
Indeed, with the SEC's focus on the national securities markets283 and the nar-
rowing scope of jurisdiction in the federal courts,28 the substantive regulation
of exotic securities has been effectively delegated to the states.2 8 5 Such alloca-
tion of responsibility fashions a proper, efficient role for both levels of govern-
ment in an otherwise redundant system of securities regulation. Fraudulent
investment schemes are best regulated, however, through broadly interpreting
the definition of a security and through enforcing the anti-fraud and merit reg-
ulation provisions of the Act, rather than through registration.
Recognition of a proper scope of state securities regulation does not negate
the public benefit of disclosure of information, which function is served
through registration or through conditioning an exemption upon an appropri-
ate disclosure requirement. What is appropriate, however, depends upon a bal-
ancing of the needs of business and the needs of the investing public. The SEC
implicitly acknowledged the point via the tiered informational requirements of
Regulation D. The new Rule 504 has no specific disclosure requirement be-
cause, in the SEC's view, equity financings of less than $500,000 are local in
nature and, accordingly, should be regulated by the states in accordance with
their regulatory philosophies. 288
The best statement of West Virginia's regulatory philosophy is found in
section 415 of the Act28 7 which embodies the Legislature's intent to make the
securities laws of West Virginia uniform with the laws of other states which
enact the Uniform Securities Act and compatible with related federal regula-
tion.288 In other words, the Legislature realized that, securities-wise, the Free
State of West Virginia does not exist.
A. Proposed Small Offering Exemption
The Uniform Securities Act has been adopted by at least thirty-three
278 Id.
2 8 Id.
280 Murphy v. Dare to be Great, Inc., [1971-78 Transfer Binder] BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH).
1 71,053 (D.C. Super. 1972); State ex rel. Parker v. Glenn Turner Enterprises, Inc., [1971-78
Transfer Binder] BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 71,023 (Idaho Dist. Ct. 1972).
281 State v. Hawaii Market Center, Inc., 52 Hawaii 642, 485 P.2d 105 (1971).
In re Long's Long Life Wormery, Inc., [1978-81 Transfer Binder] BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH)
71,441 (Iowa Ins. Comm'n 1978); In re Worm World, Inc., [1978-81 Transfer Binder] BLUE SKY L.
REP. (CCH) 1 71,414 (S.D. Sec. Div. 1978), aff'd [1978-81 Transfer Binder] BLUE SKY L. REP.
(CCH) V 71,419 (S.D. Bd. Rev. 1978).
23 Long, supra note 207, at 543, 545.
"2 See World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S.
186 (1977); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
Long, supra note 207, at 545.
288 Securities Act Release No. 33-6389, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251 (1982).
287 W. VA. CODE § 32-4-415 (1982).
288 Id.
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states, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico.28' A number of jurisdictions
have tinkered with the draft of the limited offering exemption of section
402(b)(9), including every state which borders West Virginia which has
adopted some variant of the act. Kentucky raised the prima facie figure from
10 to 25,290 and, by administrative regulation,2'1 the Kentucky administrator
supplemented the statute with Rule 146-like requirements. The Pennsylvania
statute limits offerees to fifty292 and purchasers to twenty-five28 and requires a
written investment representation from each purchaser.' 4 The Pennsylvania
statute also exempts securities sold by Exchange Act reporting companies pur-
suant to transactions which would be exempt under section 3(b) of the federal
Securities Act.298 The Maryland statute permits up to thirty-five purchasers,
but only when the administrator permits the same by rule or order,2 " which he
has done with a Rule 146-like rule.297 The Virginia exemption is framed in
terms of the number of outstanding security holders (thirty-five)29 8 following
the sale, which can be made by the issuer or a broker-dealer registered in Vir-
ginia.299 Ohio is the only bordering state which has not adopted some version
of the Uniform Securities Act but nevertheless exempts transactions which
would be exempt under section 4(2) of the federal Securities Act s so long as
brokerage commissions are paid only to broker-dealers registered in Ohio 01
and do not exceed ten percent of the aggregate sales price.30 2 Thus, the West
Virginia limited offering exemption is more restrictive than those of surround-
ing states. The statutory policy of uniformity calls for an increase in the num-
ber of permissible investors under the section 402(b)(9) exemption and, given
the prevalence of the number twenty-five, that number emerges as appropriate.
Moreover, given the inapplicability of the private offering concept to the state
act, the fact that the more analogous federal exemption turns on purchasers,
not offerees,303 and the fact that present section 402(b)(9) does not purport to
regulate the manner of the offering, the exemption would be more workable for
issuers, without diluting public protection, if the limitation is imposed upon
the number of purchasers, rather than the number of offerees. Finally, the
frightening holding of Upton should be obviated by clarifying that the numeri-
cal limitation of the exemption turns upon the number of persons who are
residents of this state, rather than are prospective investors or purchasers,
wherever located. The State of West Virginia should not be unduly concerned
209 UN1F. SECURITIES ACT, 7A U.L.A. 561 (1978) (amended 1982).
290 Ky. REv. STAT. § 292.410(1)(i) (1981 & Supp. 1982).
21 Ky. ADMIN. REGS. 10:150 (1981).
202 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 1-203(e) (Purdon 1972).
, Id. at § 1-203(d).
294 Id.
:95 Id. at § 1-203(i).
'" MD. CoRPs. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 11-602(9) (1980).
297 MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. 2, § 11-602(9) (1978).
299 VA. CODE § 13.1-514(b)(8) (1950) (amended 1981).
299 Id.
300 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.03(Q)(1) (Page 1981).
202 Id. at § 1707.03(Q)(3).
302 Id. at § 1707.03(Q)(2).
303 See supra text accompanying note 178.
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with protecting investors from Alabama.
The proposed increase in the number of permissible investors does not
undercut the Commissioner's administrative authority to further condition the
exemption. NASAA has promulgated a number of policy statements for partic-
ular types of offerings which are generally either tax-shelter oriented or specu-
lative in nature.3s 4 These NASAA policy statements generally control organiza-
tional and offering expenses,305 establish net worth requirements for
sponsors 0 and suitability criteria for investors302 and limit the compensation
I" E.g., real estate investment programs, oil and gas drilling programs, and cattle-feeding
programs.
" NASAA's Guidelines for the Registration of Oil and Gas Programs, adopted September 22,
1976, and subsequently amended on October 12, 1977, and October 31, 1979, provides, at para-
graph V.A.1, that ". . .organization and offering expenses incurred in order to sell program units
shall be reasonable, and the total of those organization and offering expenses, which may be
charged to the program, plus any management fee, which may be charged by the sponsor, shall not
exceed 15% of the initial subscriptions." 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) V 5226 (1981).
I" NASAA's Statement of Policy for Real Estate Programs, adopted April 15, 1980, and
amended effective March 30, 1982, provides, at paragraph II.B.:
The financial condition of the SPONSOR liable for the debts of the PROGRAM
must be commensurate with any financial obligations assumed in the offering and in
operation of the PROGRAM. As a minimum, such SPONSOR shall have an aggregate
financial NET WORTH, exclusive of home, automobile and home furnishings, of the
greater of either $50,000 or an amount at least equal to 5% of the gross amount of all
offerings sold within the prior 12 months plus 5% of the gross amount of the current
offering, to an aggregate maximum NET WORTH of such SPONSOR of one million
dollars.
1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) V 5362 (1982).
117 NASAA's Guidelines for the Registration of Oil and Gas Programs provides, at paragraph
IV.B.(2):
The sponsor and/or his representatives shall make every reasonable effort to ascer-
tain that the participant can reasonably benefit from the program, and the following
shall be evidence thereof:
(a) The participant has the capacity of understanding the fundamental aspects of
the program, which capacity may be evidenced by the following:
(1) The nature of employment experience;
(2) Educational level achieved;
(3) Access to advice from qualified sources, such as attorney, accountant and tax
adviser; and
(4) Prior experience with investments of a similar nature.
(b) The participant has apparent understanding:
(1) of the fundamental risks and possible financial hazards of the investment; and
(2) the lack of liquidity of the investment.
(c) The participant is able to bear the economic risk of the investment and can
reasonably benefit from the program, on the basis of his net worth and taxable income.
For purposes of determining the ability to bear the economic risk and to reasonably
benefit from the program, unless circumstances warrant and the Administrator allows
another standard, a participant shall have:
(1) a net worth of $2-25,000 or more (exclusive of home, furnishings and
automobiles), or
(2) a net worth of $60,000 or more (exclusive of home, furnishings and automobiles)
and had during the last tax year, or estimates that he will have during the current tax
year, 'taxable income' as defined in Section 63 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as
amended, of $60,000 or more, without regard to the investment in the program.
1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 5225 (1981).
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of insiders .30  Such policy statements provide tools for regulating speculative
securities, without affecting the general exemptive criteria applicable to all
issuers.
As to the disclosure of information, it seems clear that summary disclo-
sure, coupled with the right to verify the information provided, should suffice
for the small offering. The predicate of the Regulation D informational re-
quirements - "to the extent material to an understanding of the issuer, its bus-
iness, and the securities being offered"309 - provides an appropriate scope of
required disclosure. Thus, a small offering disclosure statement should include
such things as the type of business entity,31 0 the issuer's principal place of bus-
iness, its key personnel,31 1 the types of business it has conducted, its present
financial condition,12 the particular purpose or goals of the financing (i.e., the
venture), the amount of the financing, the intended use of the proceeds (in-
cluding commissions and the like), the nature of the security being offered, 313
the rights which will inure to the security holders,3 '4 the limitations, if any,
upon those rights,31 5 the obligations, if any, of the security holder,318 and the
restrictions imposed upon the liquidity of the investment.317 For the burden
upon the issuer to be realistic in the small offering situation, financial state-
ments should not have to be audited; erroneous or misleading information can
be remedied via the anti-fraud provisions.318 Additionally, to the extent that
the required information can be furnished by a specimen 319 or by an exhibit,320
such practice should be allowed.
-os NASAA's Guidelines for the Registration of Oil and Gas Programs requires that the spon-
sor's participation in program revenues be "reasonable" and sets forth detailed standards for de-
termining what is reasonable. 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 5226 (1981). NASAA's Statement of
Policy for Real Estate Programs contains detailed constraints on sponsors' compensation in the
forms of program management fees, promotional interests, and property management fees. 1 BLUE
SKY L. REP. (CCH) 5364 (1982).
309 See supra note 181.
310 E.g., corporation, partnership, joint venture, investment trust.
311 E.g., directors, officers, partners, managers.
312 I.e., current balance sheet.
313 E.g., common or preferred stock, partnership interest.
.1 E.g., right to vote, right to preferential receipt of dividends, right to prorata share of net
profits.
3,5 E.g., dividends declared only at discretion of board of directors, no right to manage or
control.
310 E.g., liability for future assessments.
31 See, e.g., supra note 163.
3'8 W. VA. CODE § 32-1-101 (1982) provides:
It is unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of any
security, directly or indirectly
(2) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they are made, not misleading;
W. VA..CODE § 32-4-410(a)(2) (1982) creates a civil right of action in a purchaser to remedy an
offer or sale of a security by means of an untrue or misleading statement of material fact.
319 E.g., a copy of the stock offering resolution or a copy of the limited partnership agreement.
320 E.g., a map, a balance sheet, a copy of the issuer's contract for distribution of the resulting
product, etc.
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One final point should be made with respect to the disclosure of informa-
tion. The present exemption does not require any disclosure; the proposal rec-
ommends the summary disclosure of minimal information. In theory, at least,
the increased protection of investors occasioned by such a requirement should
have the additional advantage of prompting the disclosure of still more infor-
mation not expressly required because the anti-fraud provision of the Act 321
proscribes the omission of a material fact necessary to make the statements
actually made not misleading. Thus, given the fraud prevention function of
state securities regulation, the efficient thrust of a disclosure requirement
should be to assure that one exists. Once a minimally sufficient disclosure re-
quirement is in place, the anti-fraud provisions should take over and the pre-
cise scope of the express requirement is largely a matter of trivial detail.
Finally, the present prohibition upon the payment of brokerage commis-
sions, if the statute was intended to be so construed, should be deleted. The
valuable function served by a securities professional should not be denied to
the promoter. Instead, if the Legislature or the Commissioner feels that the
security holders' equity should be protected, then diversion of the offering pro-
ceeds to solicitors of investors should be limited to broker-dealers and other
securities professionals registered in West Virginia and, if necessary, the com-
mission could be limited to a specified percentage of the aggregate sales price.
The State should view securities professionals as revenue-generating persons,
not pariahs.
Thus, an appropriately refashioned "small offering" exemption for West
Virginia could be framed as follows:
(1) Sales of securities of the issuer pursuant to the transaction should be
limited to not more than twenty-five persons who are residents of this State;
(2) Information regarding the issuer, its business and the securities should
be furnished in summary form, without any requirement for audited or certi-
fied financial statements, before the sale to each investor, and each investor
should have the opportunity to ask questions and inspect records so as to ver-
ify the information furnished;
(3) Brokerage commissions should be allowed with respect to sales to West
Virginia residents, but could be limited as to amount and be payable only to
broker-dealers or other professionals registered in West Virginia; and
(4) The Commissioner should have the authority to promulgate additional
exemptive criteria for speculative securities.
In this manner, the exemption can be made more certain and more workable
without creating an undue burden of compliance for promoters of small equity
financings, while, at the same time, enhancing the protection of investors.
Moreover, the Commissioner's substantive authority to regulate the merits of
an offering is always available to squelch the fraudulent schemes.
321 W. VA. CODE § 32-1-101 (1982).
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B. Proposed Intermediate Offering Exemption
The Uniform Limited Offering Exemption ("ULOE") recommended to the
states by NASAA is designed to achieve the twin objectives of uniformity
among the states and compatibility with the federal Rule 505 exemption from
registration for intermediate size offerings.32 2 Like Regulation D, ULOE
manifests a balancing of the needs of the business community to facilitate cap-
ital formation with the needs of the investing public for protection. Notably,
NASAA apparently perceived the role of ULOE in investor protection as one
of protecting against fraud, rather than uninformed investment decisions,323
which perception presumably arises from the recognition that qualification for
the compatible federal exemption - Rule 505 - requires disclosure of the kind
of information contained in Form S-18 or Part I of an applicable registration
statement. 24 In any event, NASAA seems to accept fraud prevention as the
proper scope of securities regulation at the state level, which is consistent with
the theme of this article.
The implementation of ULOE would require both legislative action and
administrative action. The proposed legislative action is the grant of authority
to the securities administrator to create a "limited offering transactional ex-
emption. . . -325 Thereafter, NASAA proposes, the securities administrator is
to take over and promulgate a rule exempting from registration "[a]ny offer or
sale of securities offered or sold in compliance with. . .Regulation D, Rules
[501-503] and [505]. .. ,"32 and which satisfies certain further conditions and
limitations.
There are five additional conditions of ULOE3 2 7 which would have to be
satisfied to qualify for the proposed state exemption: (1) Commissions, finder's
fees or other remuneration cannot be paid or given to any person for soliciting
any prospective purchaser unless the recipient of such consideration is regis-
tered as a broker-dealer, investment adviser or the like with the state;328 (2)
disqualification of state "bad boys" from using the exemption;32 9 (3) the issuer
322 Resolution of NASAA Endorsement of Revised Uniform Limited Offering Exemption (ap-
proved April 30, 1982), reprinted in 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) % 5294 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
NASAA Resolution].
23 The NASAA Resolution, supra note 322, states: "There should be a careful balancing of
the need to facilitate capital markets with protection of investors from fraud."
324 See supra text accompanying note 180.
225 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 1 5294A (1982).
326 Id.
327 Id.
328 Id.
32 The proposed Administrative Rule implementing ULOE provides, at section B:
No exemption under this rule shall be available for the securities of any issuer if any
of the parties or interest described in Securities Act of 1933, Regulation A, Rule 230.252
sections (c),(d),(e) or (f):
1. Has filed a registration statement which is subject of a currently effective stop
order entered pursuant to any state's law within five years prior to the commencement of
the offering.
2. Has been convicted within five years prior to commencement of the Qffering of
any felony or misdemeanor in connection with the purchase or sale of any security or any
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must file a notice of sales with the state securities administrator, either before
or after the first sale,330 on Form D and periodically thereafter throughout the
offering, and undertake to furnish to the administrator the information fur-
nished to offerees;331 (4) the issuer must have reasonable grounds to believe
and, after making reasonable inquiry, must actually believe that, in all sales to
non-accredited investors, (i) the investment is suitable for the purchaser upon
the basis of any facts disclosed by the purchaser regarding his other security
holdings and his financial situation and needs3 3 2 and, also, (ii) that the pur-
chaser, either alone or with a purchaser representative, has such knowledge
and experience in financial and business matters that he is capable of evaluat-
ing the merits and risks of the prospective investment; " and (5) in all sales to
natural person, non-insider accredited investors,s3  the issuer must have rea-
sonable grounds to believe and, after making reasonable inquiry, must actually
believe that (i) the purchaser, either alone or with a purchaser representative,
has such knowledge and experience in financial and business matters that he is
capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective investment,3 5 and
(ii) the investment does not exceed 20% of the investor's net worth, excluding
principal residence, furnishings therein and personal automobiles.33 Addition-
ally, ULOE would authorize the securities administrator to increase the num-
felony involving fraud or deceit including but not limited to forgery, embezzlement, ob-
taining money under false pretenses, larceny or conspiracy to defraud.
3. Is currently subject to any state administrative order or judgment entered by that
state's securities administrator within five years prior to the filing of a claim of exemp-
tion or is subject to any state's administrative order or judgment in which fraud or deceit
was found and the order or judgment was entered within five years of the expected offer
and sale of securities in reliance upon this exemption.
4. Is currently subject to any state's administrative order or judgment which prohib-
its the use of any exemption from registration in connection with the purchase or sale of
securities.
5. Is subject to any order, judgment, or decree of any court of competent jurisdiction
temporarily or preliminarily restraining or enjoining, or is subject to any order, judgment
or decree of any court of competent jurisdiction, entered within five years prior to the
commencement of the offering permanently restraining or enjoining, such person from
engaging in or continuing any conduct or practice in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security or involving the making of any false filing with any state;
6. The prohibitions of Section 1-3 & 5 above shall not apply if the party or interest
subject to the disqualifying order is duly licensed to conduct securities related business
in the state in which the administrative order or judgment was entered against such
party or interest.
Any disqualification caused by this section is automatically waived if the state which
created the basis for disqualification determines upon a showing of good cause that it is
not necessary under the circumstances that the exemption be denied.
1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) I 5294A (1982).
330 Id.
331 Id.
332 Id.
333 Id.
33' Id. The term "natural person, non-insider accredited investors" relates to those accredited
investors specified in Rule 501(a)(5),(6) and (7). See supra note 156.
335 Id.
336 Id.
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ber of purchasers or waive any other conditions of the exemption.3
At least two of the additional conditions of ULOE constitute unnecessary
restrictions on Rule 505. Requiring the issuer to make judgmental decisions
regarding whether the security being offered is suitable for a given non-accred-
ited investor and whether all investors, save insiders and institutions, are so-
phisticated enough to evaluate the merits and risks of the prospective invest-
ment, when the SEC did not deem these criteria to be necessary for investor
protection under Rule 505, interjects unwarranted elements of uncertainty and
potential liability in an already complicated process.
NASAA's proposed delegation of authority to securities administrators to
increase the number of purchasers or waive exemptive conditions, although
perhaps useful to a promoter with friends in the right places, would risk dis-
qualification for the federal exemption which, in the case of Rule 505, exists
only by virtue of the SEC's grace. Rule 505 has no statutory underpinning ex-
cept the SEC's rule-making authority under section 3(b) of the Securities
Act. s 8
The "bad boy" disqualification is a harsh one if all of the circumstances of
subsection 1.B. of ULOE are adopted. A stop order against a registration state-
ment or a temporary restraining order against the sale of a security, for exam-
ple, does not necessarily connote the type of securities law violator who ought
to be forced out of business. The provisions of subsections 1.B.6. and 1.B.7.
temper the harshness of the disqualification somewhat but, on the whole, sub-
section 1.3. is too broadly drawn. If such a disqualification provision is neces-
sary as a condition of an exemption from registration, then it should be limited
to truly egregious violators such as persons convicted of criminal conduct, or
persons who have been the subject of multiple administrative or civil liability
actions. On the whole, however, it is submitted that a promoter's track record
of securities violations should constitute a factor in the administrator's discre-
tionary exercise of substantive regulation, rather than a condition of an exemp-
tion from registration.
One of the proposed additional conditions of ULOE is a particularly sound
one, however. The filing under Regulation D is a post-sale filing and is made
with the SEC only.339 ULOE would optionally require3 4 0 a pre-sale filing with
the Commissioner and would require the issuer to undertake to furnish to the
Commissioner the informational disclosure materials furnished to investors."'
Given the merit regulation authority and fraud prevention function of a state
securities administrator,34 2 this requirement, if adopted, would put him in a
better position to fulfill his proper role. Thus, the appropriate response to the
present initiative for an exemption for intermediate size offerings compatible
with Rule 505 would be to merely implement Rule 505 by amending the Act to
337 Id.
38 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (1976).
339 17 C.F.R. § 230.503(a). See supra note 165.
340 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 5294A (1982).
341 Id.
3,2 See supra text accompanying notes 276-85.
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add a new exemption from registration for securities offered or sold which
would be exempt from the registration requirements of the federal Securities
Act by virtue of Rules 501, 502, 503 and 505 of Regulation D, with the added
provision of pre-sale filing of the Form D notice of sales form with the Com-
missioner and authority in the Commissioner to require that he be furnished
with all information furnished the investors before any sale occurs. Addition-
ally, the ULOE treatment of sales commissions is preferable to the total pro-
scription of section 402(b)(9).
C. Proposed Private Placement Exemption
With respect to the large offering, the clear message from the SEC and
NASAA is that equity financings in excess of $5 million should be principally
regulated at the federal level.34 3 If such a financing is truly local notwithstand-
ing the amount, the issuer can try to fit within the federal intrastate exemption
of section 3(a)(11) of the Securities Act8" or SEC Rule 147, 3 4' both of which
are risky propositions. Otherwise, the issuer will have to comply with new Rule
506 or the underlying statutory exemption, or register with the SEC.
At the state level, the practical burden of complying with Rule 506 will
likely exceed the burden of registration under the Uniform Securities Act,340
however, without belaboring the point, the Legislature should nevertheless give
issuers an option by enacting a provision similar to one in Ohio34 7 which would
exempt from registration in the state any offering exempt from federal regis-
tration under section 4(2) of the Securities Act. The informational require-
ments of Rule 506 are approximately as thorough as those required in a regis-
tration statement under the state Act,348 with the only difference being that
Regulation D permits omissions if certain information is not material. 4 s Con-
ceptually at least, that difference is immaterial itself because of the anti-fraud
provisions. In any event, qualification for the Rule 506 exemption serves the
function of disclosure of information approximately as well as, if not better
than, registration under the state Act. The other potential benefit of registra-
tion - ridding the security of restrictions on transfer 35 0 - is not affected because
the Regulation D restrictions apply, regardless of whether the offering is regis-
tered with a state. Thus, the investor is not harmed by implementing a Securi-
ties Act section 4(2) counterpart exemption under the state Act and the issuer
is given a choice. Moreover, because a private placement of securities qualifies
for the federal exemption of Rule 506 only when the investors are accredited,
113 Securities Act Release No. 33-6389, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251 (Mar. 16, 1982).
31 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (1976).
17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (1981).
346 W. VA. Con §§ 32-1-101 to -4-418 (1982).
"I See supra text accompanying note 300.
318 Compare Rules, supra note 150, at § 230.502(b)(2)(i)(B) with W. VA. Cons § 32-3-304(b)
(1982).
349 See supra note 181.
350 The restrictions on transfer inhibit the investor from freely liquidating the investment at
whatever time is most opportune for the investor, which runs counter to the desires of professional
venture capital investors. Casey, supra note 1, at 572.
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i.e., financially able to fend for themselves, or sophisticated, 51 implementing a
"section 4(2) exemption" in West Virginia would insulate the "little old
widow" investor from the risks of the offering, which cannot be said if the
offering was registered.
CONCLUSION
The collaborative effort of the SEC and NASAA has produced an initia-
tive to examine the workability of the limited offering exemption of the West
Virginia Uniform Securities Act. The goal is to achieve compatibility with
analogous federal exemptions and a semblance of uniformity with the relevant
law of other states. The present West Virginia limited offering exemption is
clearly unworkable and, thus, impedes capital formation.
The proper function of state securities regulation is to protect the public
from fraudulent investment schemes. This function is best served through
means other than the registration of securities. Nevertheless, requiring the dis-
closure of information pertinent to an offering of securities is sound policy, but
the extent to which enforcement of that policy should deter legitimate capital
formation is relative.
The revisions to the West Virginia Uniform Securities Act limited offering
exemption herein suggested should achieve a realistic balancing of the needs of
the public and the needs of the business community. Admittedly, the details of
the proposal are subject to discussion, but the concept of relating the burden
of compliance with the exemptive conditions to the amount of the offering ap-
propriately matches the interests of those affected. Summary disclosure of gen-
eralized information, coupled with the right of prospective investors to obtain
further information they deem important, should allow the promoter of the
small venture to obtain needed capital without diminishing necessary protec-
tion of the investor, whose interest is also furthered by the anti-fraud provi-
sions of the Uniform Securities Act and the substantive authority of the Com-
missioner to regulate the merits of the offering. The proposed revision to
section 402(b)(9) of the Act recognizes that result and also achieves a sem-
blance of uniformity with counterpart laws of other states.
When the amount of the offering reaches the intermediate level of the new
federal Rule 505, the issuer's burden of federal compliance increases to a level
the SEC deems to be appropriate anywhere in the country. West Virginia's
response should be to achieve compatibility. The proposed implementation of
Rule 505 as an additional exemption from registration under the Act accom-
plishes that goal. Moreover, by adding the requirements that the federal filing
also be made with the Commissioner before any sales occur and that the issuer
undertake to furnish the Commissioner with the information disclosed to the
investors, the proposal enhances the Commissioner's ability to fulfill his func-
tions of fraud prevention and merit regulation.
Once an offering reaches the unlimited dollar level of federal Rule 506, the
11" See supra text accompanying note 186.
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regulatory role of the states should wane. Nevertheless, the proposed "private
offering" addition to the Act affords the issuer an election between registration
and an uncertain burdensome exemption. Given the absence of any material
differences between the disclosure required under either scheme, the degree of
investor protection is not adversely affected by the proposal, and, given the
practical limitation that a private placement can be made only to investors
who are able to fend for themselves, protection of investors may be enhanced.
Regulation D has provided the initiative to make the process of venture
capital formation more realistic to the issuer of securities. The changes to the
West Virginia Securities Act proposed herein are designed to make the law of
West Virginia compatible with that initiative. Realistic venture capital forma-
tion should be important to the citizens of West Virginia because the next
Thomas Edison may live here. If so, the economy could use the lift.
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